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Critics have long recognized the powerful incentives driving managers of
public corporations to pursue personal rewards to the detriment of the firm's
owners.' Those concerned with reforming the errant ways of the public
corporation's management have frequently included independent directors
among their prescriptions: The independent directors are to monitor the
managers and curb their most serious departures from the desired goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth.2 A tacit assumption of the monitoring model
is that the independent directors will not themselves be corrupted by a quest
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1. This divergence was given popular attention in the classic A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), and is established with some theoretical rigor
in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); the conclusion is strengthened by findings in a new economic discipline
generally referred to as agency theory. See, e.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL. J. EcON. 74 (1979); Ross,
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problems, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 1973, at
134; see also Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777 (1972); Spence & Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and Individual Action, AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PROC., May 1971, at 380. See generally Symposium, Corporations and Private Property, 26J.
L. & EcON. 235-496 (1983).
2. This notion is the touchstone for the current proposals to the American Law Institute. See
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Part III (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1984). The reporter for those provisions of the ALI's corporate governance project which are
concerned with the directors' duty to monitor has based his premise upon what he believes the
directors are capable of doing, not what they in fact accomplish. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375
(1975). See generally Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969). The findings of this article do not support the belief that
boardroom colleagues can effectively monitor one another to the degree prescribed in the proposals
to the ALI.
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to maximize their own utility at the shareholders' expense.3 Indeed, the
monitoring model appears to be premised upon the unsubstantiated belief
that directors who are neither economically dependent upon the firm or its
managers, 4 nor enriched by a particular transaction, 5 will be faithful guardians
of the corporation's interest, or will allow only trivial departures by
management from the corporation's and shareholders' economic interest.
Serious mistrust has been expressed concerning the independent
directors' ability to discharge this monitoring function.6 In this article we
offer a psychological perspective on a specific application of the monitoring
function: the independent directors' assessment whether the corporation's
interest is served by a derivative suit against their "insider" colleagues. The
independent directors' assessment conventionally occurs in response to a
demand made upon the directors through derivative suit procedures. 7
Recently, independent directors have acted through special litigation
committees, often empanelled after a demand upon the full board has been
excused because the suit implicated a majority of the directors in the alleged
wrongdoing. 8 The committee evaluates the derivative suit's impact on the
corporation's interests and submits to the court its opinion whether these
interests are advanced by the suit's continuance.
We are interested in the independent directors' ability to perceive and
represent the corporate interest in evaluating a demand to the board or in
serving on a special litigation committee. We examine several social-
3. See, e.g., Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1981).
4. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170-85
(1976), wherein the attachments sought to be removed in providing independence are those of an
economic nature. See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 3.04, which
recommends that a majority of the board of a large public corporation be independent;
independence is defined in terms of familial or economic ties to the corporation or its senior
executives. Id. § 1.26.
5. This belief is at the heart of the validating effect of "disinterested" director approval common
to state conflict of interest statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(2) (West 1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP ACT § 41 (1971 & Supp. 1977). Upon approval by disinterested directors, the
presumption of propriety and fair dealing is returned to the otherwise self-dealing transaction. See E.
FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 82-86 (1972); Israels, The Corporate Triangle--Some
Comparative Aspects of the New Jersey, ATew York, and Delaware Statutes, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 627-28
(1969); cf Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980) (presumption is often, but not always returned).
6. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597
(1982); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 581 (1978); Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1663-66
(1981).
7. See generally Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 168, 169-91 (1976).
8. See generally Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L. J. 959; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1199-1208 (1977);
Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw.
U.L. REV. 96 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 600 (1980); Comment, A Procedural Treatment of Derivative Suit Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 885 (1981).
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psychological mechanisms that can generate bias in the directors' assessment
of the suit, including biases established by appointment of members to the
board or a special litigation committee, control of pecuniary or nonpecuniary
rewards made available to the independent directors by the defendant
members of the board of directors, the independent directors' prior
associations with the defendants, and their common cultural and social
heritages. We conclude that, in combination, these several psychological
mechanisms can be expected to generate subtle, but powerful, biases which
result in the independent directors' reaching a decision insulating colleagues
on the board from legal sanctions. In the final section, we offer a structural
reform to neutralize these biases when evaluating the independent directors'
recommendation.
II
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES OF DIRECTOR BIAS
A. Uncertainty and Director Bias
This section describes the normative process by which directors should
evaluate a derivative suit's impact upon the corporation's interests as well as
the psychological mechanisms that deflect the directors' consideration of the
suit's potentially beneficial effects. The theory advanced here is that directors
edit the decision choices posed by the derivative suit in a manner which
precludes consideration of the suit's favorable effects. Editing is a well-
documented approach decisionmakers utilize to simplify and reduce to
manageable proportions inherently complex decisions. 9 The near perfect
record of defendants before special litigation committees' ° suggests that such
independent directors engage in editing. As a consequence of editing, the
directors' evaluation of the suit is made, not in response to the corporation's
interests, but as a result of the directors' social and psychological drives.
1. Risk Analysis. Litigation is an uncertain event; any proper description or
evaluation of a suit's worth therefore covers an array of its possible outcomes
as well as the probability of each outcome.1 ' Courts historically have been
deferential to the directors' dismissal recommendation, so that the directors'
arraying of the outcomes and their associated probabilities is not examined;
courts instead limit their review to superficial questions about the directors'
independence and good faith. 12 To be sure, the case law reflects an outward
concern that the directors' recommendation on the derivative suit's fate must
9. See infra text accompanying notes 19-33.
10. See infra text accompanying note 187 and cases cited infra note 97.
11. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1033 (2d Cir. 1982); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F.
Supp. 694, 693-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Factors considered in this inquiry are similar to those evaluated
in determining whether a demand should be excused. See generally Note, The Demand and Standing
Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Ciii. L. REV. 168, 173-82 (1976).
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serve the corporate interest.13 In practice, however, courts fail to examine the
propriety of heuristics utilized by "independent" directors in making their
evaluation. For this reason, the case law exhibits no normative view of how
reasonably objective directors should respond to a suit that has both upside
potential and downside risk. Indeed, the record of litigation in this area
suggests to the casual observer that derivative suits lack upside potential,
because courts uncritically accept the directors' assessment that the suits have
only negative effects. This judicial passivity also explains the absence of any
well-developed notions of what standards are suitable for judging director
evaluations of a suit's worth.
The corporate interest, even though a loosely defined concept,' 4 may
nonetheless be identified using the normative economic view that an entity
appropriately seeks to maximize its expected utility. Under this approach,
generally known as expected utility theory,' 5  decisions made under
uncertainty are rational if for any given level of risk they maximize expected
returns (defined as the sum of the products of the outcomes and their
probabilities of occurrence) and if they minimize the risk between equivalent
expected returns.' 6 The utility-maximizing choice is one which is, by this
13. See, e.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Gaines
v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 771 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Abbey v. Control
Data, 603 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. G.T.E., 582
F.2d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
14. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 2.01.
15. The leading work on expected utility theory remains J. VON NEWMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944).
16. To illustrate, assume a derivative suit alleging a director diverted corporate business to
himself. Continuation of the derivative suit offers a 20% probability the net recovery will be
$500,000, a 40% probability the corporation will gain $100,000, and a residual 40% chance no
recovery will be made; moreover, the corporation will incur $400,000 in direct and indirect costs in
connection with pursuing the suit. On the other hand, should the directors recommend dismissal of
the derivative suit, their decision will be upheld by the court under the applicable law. This choice of
rejection, however, entails costs of $20,000-the attorney fees for submitting the directors' decision
and briefing the court on the relevant authorities. Finally, we assume that the cost of the directors'
evaluation is unaffected by which alternative is selected.
The decision to continue the suit has an expected value of -$20,000, determined as follows:
Outcome Weighed
Outcome Probability by Probability
$500,000 20% $100,000
$100,000 40% $ 40,000
-$400,000 40% -$160,000
Expected value -$ 20,000
Dismissal of the suit also has a value of -$20,000, the cost of preparing the required motion.
According to common assumptions under expected utility theory, managers will prefer to seek
dismissal, because between competing opportunities presenting the same expected return, the one
with less risk should be preferred. In the example, a decision to continue is riskier because it
presents a range of outcomes ($500,000 gain to a $400,000 loss) compared with a certain loss of
$20,000 upon dismissal. Another fundamental assumption of expected utility theory is that all per-
sons are risk averse so that as between choices posing the same expected return, the choice having
greater certainty is preferred; and as between choices of the same risk, the one with the higher
expected return is preferred. Furthermore, even when the riskier choice has a greater expected
return, that choice would not be embraced by the rational man if its expected return offers insuffi-
cient compensation for the risk. For example, if the decision to continue embodies an expected value
Page 83: Summer 1985]
definition, rational and which also reflects the entity's aversion to assuming
risk. If reference were made to utility theory for a normative view of how
directors should properly evaluate suits against their colleagues, then courts
would be forced to choose between commonly held assumptions about
decisionmakers' evaluation of risky choices in this regard and what appears to
be their actual practice.
There is a clean divergence between theory and practice respecting
whether managers are risk averse or risk seeking.' 7 Empirical evidence,
contrary to widely held assumptions that managers are risk averse, reveals that
managers are both risk averse and risk seeking. Their aversion to or
preference for risk depends upon the outcomes of choices in relation to a
"target point."' 8 When all potential outcomes surpass a target point such as a
desired rate of return, managers conform to the widely held assumption of
risk aversion and select the less risky choice.' 9 Managers are risk preferring,
however, whenever most of the outcomes posed by the choices fall below the
target point, as long as at least one choice has an outcome above the target
point. In this case, the managers' tendency is to prefer the choice which
affords a chance, however slight and whatever the risk, of meeting or
of $100,000 (against a certain loss of $20,000 by discontinuance), continuance is wise only if the
$100,000 expected return is higher than competing opportunities for investment.
17. A wealth of empirical evidence indicates that expected utility theory fails to capture the
complexities involved in making risky choices. For an excellent review of the studies, see
Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations, 20 J. EcON. LIT.
529 (1982).
18. A consistent body of research has repeatedly shown the important role of a target point in
the evaluation of risky choices. See, e.g., Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, Further Tests of Aspiration Level
Effect in Risky Choice Behavior, 27 MGMT. Sci. 953 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Payne, Laughhunn &
Crum, Further Tests]; Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, Translation of Gambles and Aspiration Level Effects in
Risky Choice Behavior, 26 MGMT. SCI. 1039 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Payne, Laughhunn & Crum,
Translation]. See also Holthausen, A Risk-Return Model with Risk and Return Measured as Deviations from a
Target Return, AM. EcON. REV., March 1981, at 182 (risk associated only with below-target outcomes).
That decisions under uncertainty would be made by reference to a neutral target point was first
suggested by Kahneman & Tversky in Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), and by Fishburn in Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with Below-Target
Returns, AM. EcON. REV., March 1977, at 116, although the more general notion of managers seeking
suboptimal results that "satisfice" was suggested by H. Simon in his classic book, MODELS OF MAN
241-73 (1957).
A target point can be an expected level of income, a desired rate of return, or merely the status
quo. The research data show that decisions are reached by first classifying the outcomes of each
choice as gains or losses in terms of whether the outcome is above or below the target point. In this
way, an expected value of a law suit's continuance of $ 100,000 may nevertheless be characterized as a
loss because the rate of return on the corporate time and money expended in the suit is below the
firm's traditional target return. The importance of the target point, and the characterization of
expected outcomes as gains or losses by reference to the target point, suggest that the target point is
a boundary around which attitudes toward risk change.
19. When expected values are above the target point, decision-makers are risk averse. See
Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, Further Tests, supra note 18, at 954. For example, they tend to prefer the
choice with the least downside risk, and they show a strong aversion to any choice that includes an
outcome below target compared with an alternative whose outcomes are all above target. Id.; see also
Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, Translation, supra note 18. Furthermore, among choices whose outcomes
are all above the target point, they show a strong tendency to prefer the choice having the highest
minimum outcome, even though other choices present a greater expected value.
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surpassing the target point.2 0 Such evidence implies that, to the extent
independent directors share the risk preference of managers, their evaluation
of derivative suits will be biased against continued litigation if they are
directors of successful firms whose profits and rates of return exceed a
satisfactory target level. These directors may be institutionally biased against
a suit even though it has strong upside potential, because the magnitude of
the gains are modest in comparison with those to be garnered in other areas
of the firm's activities, and because, having exceeded their target, they are
naturally risk averse. Directors of failing companies, on the other hand, might
be expected to prefer the risk of continued litigation. What we in fact
observe, however, is that even directors of failing enterprises systematically
consider only downside potential, even in suits which offer the possibility of
considerable upside gain. 2 1
2. Choice Editing. Natural aversion toward risk can hardly explain the
consistent behavior of directors in seeing only downside potential in
derivative suits. A possible explanation may be found in natural forces that
arise in decisionmaking, whereby individuals seek to keep an inherently
complex problem within their limited processing capacity. When confronted
by a multifaceted, inherently complex choice such as the choice to continue or
terminate a derivative suit, decisionmakers edit the problem by simplifying
the information relied upon to make a choice. 22 The most frequent form of
editing entails evaluating a current problem in terms of the decisionmakers'
prior experience, understanding, or belief respecting problems of that same
general type. 23 Important bias is introduced by such simplifications because
20. On the other hand, managers are risk seeking when each choice has an expected value below
the target point. Payne. Laughhunn & Crum, Mlanagerial Risk Preferences for Below-Target Returns, 26
MGrMT. SCI. 1238 (1980). See generally Fishburn & Kochenberger, Two-Piece Von Neumann-Morgenstern
Utilitv Functions, 10 DECISION Sci. 503, 517 (1979); Hershey & Schoemaker, Risk Taking and Problem
Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47J. RISK. INs. 111 (1980); Schoemaker &
Kunreuther. An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46J. RISK & INS. 603 (1979).
The illustration, supra note 16, poses a case in which each choice's mean expected return is below
the expected target point so that managers may be expected to be risk seeking, assuming the
derivative suit decision were viewed in isolation.
21. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
22. See generally Payne, Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PsYcH. BULL. 382 (1982). Complexities are
introduced not only by the number of alternatives available, such as continuance, settlement, or
dismissal, but also by the number of outcomes for each alternative, the time constraints, and the
substance of the problem. It is interesting that heightened aversion to risk occurs as the time for
making a decision is shortened. See, e.g., Wright, The Harassed Decision Maker: Time Pressures, Distraction
and the Use of Evidence, 59J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 555 (1974). Furthermore, risk aversion increases as
the consequences of an outcome are experienced immediately rather than in the future. See Wright &
Weitz, Time Horizon Effects on Product Evaluation Strategies, 14 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 429 (1977). See
also Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects ofJudgmental Heuristics, 90 PSYcH.
BULL. 197 (1981). For an expanded discussion of the many variables which interdict normative
decisionmaking as prescribed by expected utility theory, see D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOViC & A. TVERSKY,
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
23. See generally Fischoff, Hindsight Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, I J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE 288, 292-93 (1975)
(reporting outcome increases perceived probability of event); Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (1972); Lichtenstein, Slovic,
Fischoff. Layman & CombsJudged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN
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of the well-recognized tendency of decisionmakers to give insufficient
attention to material differences between the choice at hand and the
experience drawn upon in the simplification.24  For example, directors
confronted with a demand can be expected 
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affect their estimations of the suit's potential outcomes and their associated
probabilities. 29 Certainly there is a well-documented tendency among
decisionmakers to engage in a good deal of "wishful thinking" when
formulating such estimates30 for the perfectly understandable reason that
differences in motivation will influence one's cognitive appreciation of an
outcome's likely occurrence. Those outcomes that satisfy the decisionmaker's
needs will be assigned a higher probability of occurrence than a less desired
or unwanted outcome.
The most sweeping form of editing a complex, risky choice occurs through
the decisionmakers' consideration of the collateral consequences of an
outcome and the decisionmakers' special needs or circumstances. That is, the
derived value to decisionmakers of a risky choice will not reflect solely the
decisionmakers' attitudes toward its monetary effect. Any decision under
uncertainty is necessarily made more complex by the presence of additional
consequences which attach to one of its possible outcomes. In the context of
business decisionmaking, if a sales manager needs only an additional
$100,000 in sales to earn a large bonus, there will be a steep rise in his utility
function around the business choice which includes among its outcomes a
$100,000 increase in sales. This incentive makes itself felt by a subconscious
assignment of more weight to that outcome than its magnitude would
otherwise justify-3 1 A different heuristic occurs when the collateral
consequence is negative, such as one of the choices including an outcome
with a loss of $100,000, which would entail the collateral effect that the
manager will lose his job. Some outcomes, such as that just described, are so
personally ruinous that the decisionmaker will edit the problem in a way that
the choice embodying the ruinous outcome is eliminated from further
consideration. 32 The editing out of "ruinous loss" is therefore the ultimate
tool employed to simplify complex problems.
The near perfect record of derivative suit defendants before their boards
or committees 33 is statistically so unexpected as to suggest that the
defendants' colleagues have simplified the complex decision by editing the
choices to foreclose further consideration of the choice to continue suit. Such
a reaction is more likely to occur where the repercussions accompanying a
decision to continue suit against a colleague threaten the reward structure
linking the director and his corporate position, which is of great importance
to satisfying the director's social needs. The next section offers insight into
29. See infra text accompanying notes 34-72.
30. See Yaari, Convexity in the Theory of Choice Under Risk, 79 Q. J. ECON. 278, 290 (1965); P.
SLOVIC, VALUE AS A DETERMINER OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN ELECTRONICS (1966); Irwin, Stated Expectations as Functions of Probability and Desirability of
Outcomes, 21 J. PERSONALITY 329 (1953); Marks, The Effect of Probability, Desirability, and 'Privilege' on the
Stated Expectations of Children, 19J. PERSONALITY 332, 341-44 (1951); see also Rossett, Weak Experimental
Verification of Expected Utility Hypothesis, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 481, 487-89 (1971) (supporting Yaari's
hypothesis).
31. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 18, at 277-80.
32. See Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, supra note 20, at 1245-46.
33. See supra note 10.
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the relationship between directors' social needs and their service on corporate
boards. The evidence amassed strongly suggests that a director's evaluation
of a colleague's behavior is more likely to be dictated by the director's social
or psychological drives than by the corporate interest.
B. Social Needs and Director Service
The leading criterion for selecting a board nominee is his probable
identification with and acceptance of the company's goals and methods of
operation.3 4 This selection criterion reflects the goal that boards of directors
include executives of other corporations, who can be relied upon to know and
understand the chief executive officer's problems in managing a company. 35
The corporate executive's background also includes knowledge and
experience that are believed to be necessary for a director to discharge his
office competently. 36 Another overriding consideration is that the board
nominee's personality should be compatible with that of the current
directors. 37 Indeed, the new board member is expected not only to work
within the group's collective views of the corporate interest, but also to
cooperate with other board members in reaching decisions by group
consensus.38 Individuals who are quarrelsome, disagreeable, or rigid are
disfavored: they fail to fit within the desired mold of "loyal independence"3 9
by which management is given the benefit of the doubt.40
While boards seek members who are sympathetic and compatible, director
nominees, correlatively, avoid boards whose members are seen as weak or of
low status. 41 This mutual attraction between board members follows the well-
documented practice of individuals to select and sustain their participation in
groups whose members they see as agreeable, cooperative, and like
34. See, e.g., J. BACON &J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 30; M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
97-101 (1971).
35. See generally Buchan, Boards of Directors: Adversaries orAdvisers, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1981,
at 31, 32 (CEO's know what it is to run a company); Firstenberg & Malkiel, lIhy Corporate Boards Need
Independent Directors, MGMT. REV., April 1980, at 26, 37 (need for informed board); Sethi,
Cunningham & Swanson, The Catch-22 in Reform Proposals for Restructuring Corporate Boards, MGMT.
REV., Jan. 1979, at 27 (CEO's know what it is to run a company). A recent survey found that 92% of
the chairmen polled disagreed with the proposition that boards should have more directors with
nonbusiness backgrounds. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 12 (1984).
36. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 35; see also J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 30;
Sturdivant & Adler, Executive Origins: Still a Gray Flannel World, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1976, at
125,. 131-32.
37. Studies which have examined the patterns present in the new selection of replacements to
the board of directors support the view that directors seek nominees of the same social class and
whose experience will assure that all board members will share a common view of reality and easily
reach consensus on questions presented to the board. See Koenig, Gogel & Sonquist, .Mlodels of the
Significance of Interlocking Corporate Directorates, 38 AM. J. ECON. & SoC. 173, 176-83 (1979); see also
Allen, Economic Interest Groups and the Corporate Elite Structure, 58 Soc. Sci. Q 597, 597-607 (1978).
38. J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 29-33.
39. See Firstenberg & Malkiel, supra note 35, at 26; see also M. MACE, supra note 34, at 98;J. BACON
&J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 53-54.
40. See M. MACE, supra note 34, at 97-101.
41. See generally id at 101-06 ("motivations of directors to serve").
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themselves. 42 Importantly, these attitudes contribute to the lack of dissent so
prevalent among directors. 43
When an individual perceives a group, such as his colleagues on the board,
as agreeable, not only is he attracted to continued association with the group,
but also because of this attraction he conforms his actions to the group's
views. 44 Within-group conformity occurs for both positive and negative
reasons. The positive reasons include personal reinforcements, enhanced
self-esteem, and the comfortable atmosphere associated with agreeable social
relations. 4 5 In addition, there are negative factors that can cause conformity,
including fear of rejection and group censure for individual dissent from
consensus goals.46 Not only do these positive and negative factors tend to
influence a group member's attitudes toward conformity, but the value or
strength of the member's attraction to the group acts as a multiplier on the
directional causes of conformity.47 This motivational multiplier creates an
even stronger tendency for the individual to conform his personal goals,
opinions, and acts to the goals, norms, and actions of highly valued groups.48
Thus, the additive tendency to conform created by positive and negative
factors, when multiplied by a member's high valuation of membership within
a group, produces a very powerful ingroup bias within the congenial
corporate board.49
42. See, e.g., Byrne & Griffitt, Interpersonal Attraction, 24 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 317 (1973);
Byrne, Griffitt & Stefaniak, Attraction and Similarity of Personality Characteristics, 5J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 82 (1967); Bryne, Interpersonal Attraction as a Function of Affiliation Need and Attitude
Similarity, 14 HUM. REL. 283 (1961); Byrne, Interpersonal Attraction and Attitude Similarity, 62 J. ABN. &
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 713, 713 (1961); Huston & Levinger, Interpersonal Attraction and Relationships, 29
ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1978); Marks, Interests and Group Formation, 12 HUM. REL. 385 (1959).
43. Several popular accounts of this lack of objectivity and dissent on boards have been
published. See, e.g., T. WHISLER, THE RULES OF THE GAME: INSIDE THE CORPORATE BOARDROOM
(1984); M. MACE, supra note 34. One case study found that directors who discover after a few
attempts that their views are not supported by their boardroom colleagues either cease raising points
they believe will prove unpopular or withdraw from the board. J. BACON &J. BROWN, supra note 25,
at 42.
44. See Endle & Hartley, Relative Competence, Reinforcement and Conformity, 3 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 63 (1973);Jones, Gergen &Jones, Tactits of Ingratiation Among Leaders and Subordinates in a
Status Hierarchy. 77 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 1 (1963).
45. Backman & Secord, The Effect of Perceived Liking on Interpersonal Attraction, 12 HUM. REL. 379
(1959).
46. See. e.g., Bovard, Group Structure and Perception, 46 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 398, 403
(1951).
47. See, e.g., Berkowitz, Group Norms Among Bomber Crews: Patterns of Perceived Crew Attitudes,
-Actual" Crew Attitudes, and Crew Liking Related to Aircrew Effectiveness in Far Eastern Combat, 19
SOCIOMETRY 141 (1956); Berkowitz, Group Standards, Cohesiveness and Productivity, 7 HUM. REL. 509,
519 (1954).
48. See, e.g., Dittes & Kelley, Effects of Different Conditions of Acceptance Upon Conformity to Group
.Vorms, 53 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 100 (1956); Gerard, The Anchorage of Opinion in Face to Face
Groups, 7 HUM. REL. 313 (1954).
49. See generally G. LEVINGER & J. SNOEK, ArrRACTION IN RELATIONSHIP: A NEW LOOK AT
INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION (1972); Back, Influence Through Social Communication, 46 J. ABN. & SOC.
PSYCI4OLOGY 9 (1951); Berkowitz & McCaulay, Some Effects of Differences in Status Level and Status
Stability, 14 HUM. REL. 135, 138, 146 (1961) (fear of loss of status produces conformity); Dittes,
AIttractiveness of Group as a Function of Self-Esteem and Acceptance by Group, 59 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
77 (1959); Dittes & Kelley, supra note 48; Kelley & Shapiro, An Experiment on Conformity to Group Norms
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Generally, social psychologists find that a person's motivation to conform
is governed by positive factors when his attraction to the group is low and by
negative factors when it is high. At intermediate levels of motivation, both
positive attraction and negative fear operate in the same direction and with
similar forces to increase within-group conformity and out-group bias. Under
high motivation conditions, however, negative fear of rejection generated by
the belief that a member's decisions are being evaluated against the norms of
the group to which he is attracted becomes a much stronger influence
compared to positive social factors in determining conformity. 50 Thus, in our
particular situation, where individuals highly value their membership on a
corporate board, the negative awareness that continued participation is
conditional, and that their performance must be acceptable to the group,
tends to dampen dissent. 5 1
Conformity and overall cohesion within the group increase with the value
each member places on membership in the group. In the case of a
directorship of a public corporation, this value is extremely high. The reward
which dominates the thinking of those considering an invitation to serve on a
corporation's board of directors is nonmonetary. 52 Individuals learning of
Where Conformity is Detrimental to Group Achievement, 19 AM. Soc. REV. 667, 677 (1954) (valuation of
membership correlates with conformity).
50. There is a well-documented tendency for a member of a group to modify his conduct more
and more as he becomes aware that his nonconforming opinions are likely to cause his rejection from
the group. See Byrne & Nelson, Attraction as a Lineal Function of Proportion of Positive Reiiforcements. I J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 659 (1965); Snoek, Some Effects of Rejection Upon Alraction to a Group.
64 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 175 (1962); cf Golightly & Byrne, Attitude Statements as Positive and
Negative Reinforcements, 146 Sci. 798, 799 (1964) ("presentation of statements with attitudes similar
and dissimilar to those of subject acted to change response probability"). And, of course, the more
accepted one feels by a group, the more likely it is that one will conform one's beliefs to those of the
group. See, e.g., Byrne & Rhamey, Magnitude of Positive and Negative Reinforcements a a Deteirinate of
Attraction, 2 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 884 (1965).
51. The psychological literature documents the well-established agenda of tihe impact of
contingent rewards upon conformity. See generally Scott, Attitude Changes Through Revaid of I'O-bal
Behavior, 55J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 72 (1957); Wallace, Role Reward and Dissonance Reductions. 3J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 305 (1966) (role-based rewards change attitudes).
52. Many have reasoned that the compensation paid to outside directors isi a reward which
makes them beholden to those whom they credit with securing their nomination. Ser. rig.. Dent. supra
note 8, at 112-13; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors. 65 CORNF .i. L.
REV. 600, 620 (1980); cf. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 144-47. Median direcuor cmipensation tor a
public industrial corporation today approaches $19,000, with an additional $2.000-$3.000 garnered
in fees for service on board committees. The data on director compensation are quite sensitive to
the size and industry classification of the company. In the most recent study, including the 1.000
largest corporations, average outside director compensation was $17,262 with the average industrial
paying $18,783. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 7 (1984). in this group. the mean
compensation of outside directors of companies having assets in excess of $2 billion was $32.606. Id.
This figure is consistent with a 1981 study of 1,065 manufacturing, financial, and nonmianufai uring
companies where median outside director compensation for all manulacturing companies was
$25,000 and for financial and nonmanufacturing firms median compensation was $15.800 and
$21,085, respectively. J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: CoMPE;NSATION, TVHE
CONFERENCE BOARD REPT. No. 815, at 1 (1981); see also Lear, Compenaation for Outside Directo., FtARV.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 18. To be added to the director compensation are the fees directors
earn through membership on special committees of the board of directors which average beuween
$300 and $500 per meeting attended. J. BACON, supra. at 8-9. An additional source ofc .om| elisiion
are the myriad of fringe benefits that about one-half of the surveyed corporations make available Io
their outside directors. Id. at 13. In anv case, combining four or five directorships a Lu-ge p.blic
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their nomination to the board think first of the prestige, the influence, and the
pleasure of associating with other successful people with whom they will share
the challenges of being a director. 53 Those who serve as directors look
forward to serving with others they admire, with whom they wish to become
better acquainted, and with whom they wish to work on. important matters. 54
These preferences are a manifestation of the inherent drive for affiliation and
companionship which motivates people throughout life to seek self-identity in
a group. Through attachment to a group, especially one of high prestige,
individuals satisfy their needs to validate their self-worth, particularly by the
group's feedback. 55 Membership on the board of a public corporation, of
corporations would unquestionably be what Lord Boothy once referred to as "total heaven, like
having a permanent hot bath." See Soft Boards, TIME, Oct. 5, 1962, at 96.
But for most directors their compensation is not an important factor in their desires or decision to
become a director. J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 56-57. This may well be due to large
personal income from their primary vocation so that their declining utility for additional wealth
explains why director compensation is at best a secondary consideration. This thesis is borne out by
the fact that the average cash income for newly named directors in 1981 was $279,100, with only
14% of those included in the survey reporting income less than $100,000. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES,
DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982). Only two percent of the newly elected directors derived income principally
from directors' fees. Id. To be sure, the average director in a recent survey served on 3.5 boards;
this figure includes the outside director's service on his own employer corporation board for which
no director compensation is earned. See id. at 7. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 7 (1980).
Four out of five directors recently polled felt adequately compensated for their service on the board.
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 8 (1983).
53. This factor is suggested in the survey of directors' attitudes in which across all sizes of
companies and industries the strongest factor identified by outside directors in joining a
corporation's board is the quality of its present board. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING
BOARD 10 (1983). The present board's quality is identified ten times more often than the
compensation earned through the directorship. Id. This attitude is reflected in the informed studies
by commentators on the operation of boards of directors. See, e.g., S. VANCE, CORPORATE LEADERSHIP
BOARDS, DIRECTORS, AND STRATEGY 22-59 (1983); Hannan, supra note 25, at 24. Professor Mace sums
up the director's reaction to an invitation to serve with other prestigious individuals as "a little bit
like being knighted." M. MACE, supra note 34, at 88.
54. See J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 56.
55. To explain the nature and meaning of social needs, biological theorists assume that human
beings possess an innate "need to affiliate with other humans" and this human social need is a
homogeneous dispostion or drive to affiliate. See, e.g., Martimor, Sociability: The Need for Human Social
Interchange, 2 ANNALS MED. PSYCHOLOGY 807 (1979). By disposition or drive, these biological
theorists mean, operationally, that human beings will expend effort, learn new skills, or endure pain
to achieve social interaction with others. Social learning theorists, on the other hand, assume that
social needs are acquired by conditioned reinforcement; social needs are defined operationally by
social learning theorists in terms of new learning, or other techniques traditionally used by scientists.
The classic operational demonstration that motivation for social interaction operates according to
the rules of primary drives is contained in Gewirtz & Baer, The Effect of Brief Social Deprivation on
Behaviors for a Social Reinforcer, 56 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 49 (1958). Social learning theorists
assume that social needs are ultimately based on the prior satisfaction and continued reinforcement
of primary needs, such as hunger, thirst, sex, and safety, and the association of these primary drive
satisfactions with significant other human beings, such as parents, teachers, or peers. Social learning
theory assumes that conditioned secondary social needs generalize from early childhood interaction
to all adult human social interactions.
Role theorists define social needs in relation to the part that other human beings play in defining
the individual's self-identity and maintaining the individual's self-esteem; they assume that the need
for social feedback to validate self-identity (Who am I?) and self-worth (Am I a good person?) is an
important, compelling social motive. Role theorists operationally define social needs in terms of the
high frequency of social interactions in everyday life, the phenomenological experience of loneliness
when separated from other human beings, and the subjective satisfactions that people express based
on social participation. Role theorists claim that the need for social validation and social meaning is
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course, confers the additional reward of increased status derived from the
overall high prestige of the other board members.
The nonmonetary rewards for the executive officer who serves on another
corporation's board are even richer than those other outsiders enjoy. This
class of directors is particularly important because over seventy-five percent of
all outside directors are themselves executives of other corporations, and
most of these are chief executive officers. 56 For the executive, a directorship
on another corporation's board holds the potential of enlightening glimpses
of self-analysis and comparison with his peers. The executive's need to
confirm his own managerial style, policies, and practices is quite
understandable in view of the limited outside experience of most chief
executive officers. A significant percentage of senior executive personnel
have devoted their entire professional careers to service with a single
corporate employer, 57 and most chief executive officers devote nearly all their
professional time to their company. Membership on another corporation's
board of directors, therefore, is a welcome escape from the parochialism of
one's own firm.
There are, of course, other benefits derived from service on another
corporation's board of directors. Through such service, executives gain
broader insight into trends in finance, technology, marketing, and other fields
of interest to their firm. Moreover, exposure to another firm's problems can
provide advance warning of potential problem areas in their own firm, as well
as insight into the strengths of contrasting management styles. Finally,
association with other executives on the board provides a reassuring and
based not on expectations of material reward, but is based instead on the expectation that social
relations will be inherently self-validating and worthwhile. See, e.g., Markus, The Self in Thought and
Memory, in THE SELF IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 102 (D. Wegner & R. Valacher eds. 1980).
Finally, Reykowski suggests that the "traditional view of social motivation as originating from a
number of social needs (or drives, or motives), . . . is much too simplistic." See Reykowski, Social
iVotivation, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 123 (1982). He argues that social motivation is based on a
number of factors that jointly generate a tendency for people to interact socially. His list of social
need factors includes motivation based on the ability of other people to satisfy basic needs such as
hunger, protection, approval, aggression, or stimulation; social need factors based on the similarity
of adult social relations to early parent-child interactions; and finally, social need factors of feedback
to give personal meaning to the self, and validate the worth of the individual through meaningful
interactions. The consensus is that human beings possess a strong need, drive, tendency, trait, or
motivation to form cooperative, interdependent, interactive relations with other people; that
individuals experience satisfactions in and are reinforced by social living; and people learn new skills,
expend effort, and endure pain to obtain the opportunity for social relations. Since all these
operational definitions support the existence of a powerful, pervasive human social need, the
particular theoretical explanation is not critical to our argument.
56. In the most recent survey, 77% of the newly named directors in 1979 were either the
chairman, chief executive officer, or president of their firm (55% so identified themselves) or were an
executive officer (22%). HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 6 (1980); see also J. BACON,
CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITrEES OF THE BOARD 39 (Table
9)(1973).
57. Interestingly, corporate executives appear to be losing mobility over time. In 1900 some
8.6% of corporate executives had work experience limited to one company; a 1975 study found that
of 400 top executives in the 300 largest industrial corporations, 42.5% had worked only for one firm.
See Sturdivant & Adler, supra note 36, at 131. Of the surveyed directors, 75% percent served on
another corporation's board of directors. Id. at 131-32.
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informal environment for candid discussions about issues at the executive's
own corporation. These discussions cannot always be carried out as openly or
in as relaxed an environment with that executive's own directors or
management team, as they can with associates on another corporation's
bo-rd.5 8
A further factor driving an individual to conform his behavior to another's
normative view is the personal reward the individual derives from being
singled out for membership in the group and from the attention gained
through such membership. The presence of this type of reward and its effect
on behavior was given international attention over fifty years ago in the classic
Hawthorne Studies. 59 In those studies, the selection of two groups of workers
caused productivity increases and favorable attitude changes independent of
changes ascribable to differing working conditions or manner of
compensation; some productivity increase even occurred in counterintuitive
situations, such as poor illumination of the work place. The observed
behavior was explained by the satisfaction each worker derived from the social
interaction with fellow workers, the prestige of having been appointed to the
special study group, and the pleasure of being consulted by the company's
researchers. 60 Importantly, the behavior modifications were in the direction
favorable to the employer, the source of the reward.
58. Seej. BACON &J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 57; see also Sturdivant & Adler, supra note 36, at
131.
59. See F. ROETHLISBERGER & N. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939); H.
LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED: Management and the Worker, ITS CRITICS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
HUMAN RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY (1958); Turner, Test Room in Employee Effectiveness, 23 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 577 (1933).
60. In another variation, one group of workers was paid on a piece rate basis, while a second
group was paid on a set wage scale; the result, under either condition, was a continuing increase in
productivity for both groups. Overall, the individual operators increased their output between 40%
and 62% percent over a four-year period. See Turner, supra note 59. Not all social scientists agree
with the theoretical conclusions of the Hawthorne Studies, arguing that the primary cause of the
increased performance and job satisfaction at the Hawthorne plant among the experimental workers
was not their selection by management and the resulting social and personal feelings of importance
among the selected workers, but instead, that the financial incentives of the work were the principal
influences on work morale and behavior. See Carey, The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical Criticism, 32 AM.
Soc. REV. 403, 415-16 (1967). Most social scientists, however, support the major conclusions of the
Hawthorne Studies. See, e.g., Shepard, On Alex Carey's Radical Criticism of the Hawthorne Studies, 14
ACAD. MGMT. J. 23 (1971). Shepard reexamined the Hawthorne studies and found that financial
incentives were not independent causes of work morale and behavior change; rather, he found that
money operates only indirectly through social and psychological factors, such as worker goals,
intentions, job satisfactions, and feelings of self-worth, to change personal attitudes, feelings, and
behaviors toward management and the corporation. Id. at 30-31. In further support of Shepard's
conclusion that financial rewards were not the major independent factor in work morale and behavior
change, Locke, Bryan & Kendall showed, in experimental and statistical studies, that money is not an
important independent variable in work morale and behavior change. See Locke, Bryan & Kendall,
Goals and Intentions as Mediators of the Effects of Monetary Incentives on Behavior, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
104 (1968). See generally Opsahl & Dennette, The Role of Financial Compensation in Industrial Motivation,
66 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 94 (1966). They confirmed the original conclusion of the Hawthorne
Studies that social atmosphere, selection to a special group, and management attention are very
important factors in work morale and behavior change, while they found that money, by itself, has no
significant independent effect on worker morale and behavior change. The conclusion seems evident
that financial incentives and social-psychological factors jointly determine personal attitudes. Both
sets of factors are at work in the special litigation committee situation, and these sets of factors
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Research subsequent to the Hawthorne Studies has confirmed the
conclusion that selection to a special group not only enhances morale but
more importantly generates positive attitudes towards those who selected the
subject for membership in the special group and thereafter lavished attention
on the group. For example, Likert found that when managers and employees
are selected to participate in committees designed to addresss "company
issues," when they are made to feel influential and important, are given access
to information about company goals, and are left to reach their own
consensus about how to achieve these goals, there is a significant increase in
their feelings of loyalty, their identification with the committee, and their
gratitude toward superiors who placed them in their new role.6' In this way,
the act of selection bonds the selectee to the selector.
In current corporate practice, the chief officer of the appointing company
is the principal source of rewards which attach with appointment to the board.
Under conventional procedures, directors are handpicked by the chief
executive officer.62 Furthermore, their performance and continuation as
directors are evaluated primarily by the chief executive officer. 63 Because of
the importance of the chief executive officer, advocates of greater director
independence have urged a restructuring of the corporate organization
through the use of a nominating committee 64 to buffer the influence of the
chief executive, as well as that of other insiders, over the selection of
directors. Indeed, an increase in use of nominating committees in public
(financial incentives, special attention, and social-psychological factors) tend to influence the
members of the special litigation committee in the same way-namely, in a direction more favorable
to the defendant member of the board of directors and against the plaintiff in the derivative action
litigation.
Blum & Naylor concluded that
The Hawthorne Studies are significant because . . . they recognize that [morale] is the result of
the specific change plus the employee's attitudes, his social situation on the job, and his previous
attitudes as determined in his personal history and background. They are as timely now as when
they were first conducted.
See M. BLUM &J. NAYLOR, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ITS THEORETICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS 326
(1967) (emphasis in original).
61. See Likert, Measuring Organizational Performance, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1958, at 41, 46-
48; see also Locke, Bryan & Kendall, supra note 60. The implications of all of these studies of the
Hawthorne Effect are that selection to a special committee-as in the original Hawthorne Study, or
more recently in a quality circle, in the case of derivative litigation, selection to a special litigation
committee-will enhance the selected member's attraction to and cohesion with the corporation and
will make the selected member's attitude more positive toward management and the board members
who selected him for special committee membership. Thus, the Hawthorne Effect Studies and the
follow-up studies all suggest that selection of board members to serve on a special litigation
committee can create positive feelings between the members of the special litigation committee and
the other board members, and that these positive feelings can introduce subtle, but powerful,
structural biases into the deliberations of the special litigation committee. Furthermore, these biases
uniformly tend to support the defendants' case in the derivative suit litigation and to work against the
plaintiff's charges.
62. M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 146.
63. See S. VANCE, supra note 53, at 23; M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 147; M. MACE, supra note
34, at 94-95.
64. This is the position of the proposal to the American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 3.06, and of the reporter for that proposal, M. EISENBERG,
supra note 34, at 174-77.
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corporations is popularly seen as evidence of an informed and desirable
movement toward more independent boards of directors. 65
On closer analysis, however, the nominating committee usually creates
only an illusion of distance between the chief executive officer and the outside
nominee. In a significant percentage of nominating committees, the chief
executive officer chairs the nominating committee. 66  Even when the
nominating committee is staffed entirely by outsiders, the chief executive
officer frequently attends the committee meetings and participates in
discussions. 67 In other instances, the committee is chaired by the chief
executive officer of another company, 68 who can be expected to be
sympathetic with the company's management on the question of the "right
type of person" to serve as a director. Committee practices commonly
include informal discussion with the chief executive officer about potential
nominees before formalizing the nomination. 69 Certainly it is standard
procedure for committee nominations to be submitted to the full board for
final action. 70 The committee can therefore be expected to make sure that its
nominees are acceptable to the inside directors and, more importantly, to the
chief executive officer.7 ' From the above it can be seen that the express or
tacit approval of the chief executive officer is from the committee's
perspective both a desideratum and in most cases a reality. This conclusion is
further supported by works indicating that throughout the process of
considering nominees there is pervasive concern that the nominee be one
sensitive to the corporation's goals and acceptable to the chief executive
officer, who informs the nominee of his service on the company's board.72
The process by which board members are selected, the criteria by which
their candidacy and continued service are evaluated, and the motives and
rewards that impel nominees and directors to serve on the board all interact
to form a highly cohesive group of mutually attractive individuals. All
available evidence suggests that the strength of this attraction among the
directors and the value they each place upon their membership in the group
are extremely high. For example, the selection criteria generate boards of
65. Nominating committees, existing in only 9.2% of the largest corporations in 1976, were
present in 79.1% in 1982. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 5.(1983). Independent
directors (defined as outsiders without any business or family ties to the company) constituted 84.2%
of all directors serving on nominating committees in 1982. Id.
66. Based on 1982 data, three-fourths of the nominating committees of the large industrial
corporations are chaired by an independent director. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING
BOARD 4 (1983). The evidence is that in other instances the chief executive officer chairs the
committee. See Perham, The Men Who Pick the Board, DUNS REV., Dec. 1978, at 57.
67. See Perham, supra note 66, at 57-58.
68. Id. at 57.
69. Id. at 58.
70. J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE AND THE
DIRECTORS SELECTION PROCESS (1981); The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAW.
1335, 1341-46 (1980); Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1625 (1978). This practice is
recommended in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, § 3.06(b)(1).
71. See Perham, supra note 66, at 57-58; see alsoJ. BACON &J. BROWN, supra note 25, at 135, 138.
72. See supra note 34; STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE ROLE AND COMPOSITION OF
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATION 17-21 (1978).
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directors who have highly similar backgrounds, goals, talents, and work
experience: a highly cohesive, cooperative set of directors who share
corporate attitudes and loyalties. In addition, the shared perception of
mutual agreeableness enhances the interpersonal attraction among ingroup
members and this enhanced mutual attraction creates even more conformity.
The very high nonmonetary personal value that directors place on continued
membership on these highly prestigious boards tend to multiply the overall
cohesion of the group even more. Finally, enchanced self-esteem derived
from being singled out for membership in the select group and the increased
attention' associated with continued group membership contribute
importantly to ingroup cohesion within the boardroom and special litigation
committee. Taken together, these studies all suggest that powerful
psychological factors are at work within the boardroom, creating a cohesive,
loyal, conforming ingroup that will support its members for positive and
negative reasons, under low and high levels of motivation and group values.
C. The Board, Self-Validation, and Bias
Prior or ongoing interaction between individuals, called interpersonal
familiarity in the psychological literature, has been repeatedly demonstrated
to be a source for strong biases favoring a familiar ingroup and correlatively
disfavoring a threatening or unfamilar outgroup. 73 Ingroup bias is generated
by the tendency to raise or reinforce one's own self-worth by magnifying
differences between a person's ingroup and a threatening outgroup. In the
small group or committee, ingroup bias is an analog of ethnocentrism among
larger populations and nations. Both psychological research and real world
experience support the conclusion that ingroup bias is a remarkably prevalent
and robust phenomenon, 74 one that is caused by many psychological factors,
including hostility, conflict, competition, importance of the group differences,
and familiarity with the environment. 75 Each of these factors is present in the
directors' evaluation of an "outsider's" suit against their colleague.
Intergroup comparison is a common device for self-validation, and provides
the source for the intergroup bias described in this section.
73. See generally H. TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES (1981); DIFFERENTIATION
BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS (H. Tajfel ed. 1978); SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS (H.
Tajfel ed. 1982).
74. See sources cited supra note 73. An excellent review of the leading works on this subject is
Brewer, In Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCH.
BULL. 307 (1979). For an interesting application of this phenomenon in an ally's tendency to
overestimate the strength of an ally and underestimate that of an enemy, see Bass & Dunterman,
Biases in the Evaluation of One's Own Group, Its Allies and Opponents, 7 CONFLICT RESOLUTION 16 (1963).
75. See, e.g., M. SHERIF, 0. HARVEY, B. WHITE, W. HOOD & C. SHERIF, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION: THE ROBBER'S CAVE EXPERIMENT (1961) [hereinafter cited as SHERIF]; Allen & Wilder,
Categorization, Belief Similarity, and Intergroup Discrimination, 32J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 971
(1975); Dion, Cohesiveness as a Determinant of In-Group-Outgroup Bias, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 163 (1973); Kahn & Ryen, Factors Influencing the Bias Towards One's Own Group, 2 INT. J.
GROUP TENSIONS 33 (1972); Tajfel & Billig, Familiarity and Categorization in Intergroup Behavior, 10 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1974); Worchel, Andreoli & Folger, Intergroup Cooperation and
Intergroup Attraction: The Effect of Previous Interaction and Outcome of Combined Effort, J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 13 (1975).
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1. Ingroup/Intergroup Bias. The researchers involved in the classic Robbers'
Cave experiment, 76 for example, hypothesized that competition between
ingroup and outgroup members is the major force which causes intergroup
discrimination. 77 They further believed that, when cooperation between two
formerly distinct groups is required to complete an important common task,
intergroup attractiveness occurs and over time the discriminatory practices
between the two groups will disappear. 78 Both predictions were generally
confirmed in the Robbers' Cave experiment, but the explanations for these
results were not.
In the Robbers' Cave experiment, two groups of boys at a summer camp
were initially involved in a variety of camping activities, such as cooking their
own meals and transporting boats to a river. These tasks were conducted in
distinct groups and the resulting familiarity among the members within each
group created positive ingroup cohesion. Thereafter, competitive games
between the two groups were conducted, with one group winning and the
other losing. Following the competition, a marked increase in hostility and
generally unfavorable attitudes toward outgroup members were found.
Correlatively, following the competition, a sharp increase in favorable
comments about, and attitudes toward, ingroup members also appeared. The
two groups were then introduced to a series of tasks that could only be
accomplished through the cooperative efforts of both groups. Intergroup
hostility declined and positive attitudes toward outgroup members began to
appear, becoming stronger as more and more cooperative tasks were
successfully completed.
Some of the evidence reported in connection with the Robbers' Cave
experiment questions the study's hypothesis that competition alone produces
the intergroup bias. The study's researchers observed in anecdotal remarks
that shortly after the subjects were separated into groups, and prior to their
competition with one another, many of the subjects jeered at the members of
the other group and offered threatening challenges. 79 The suggestion is that
categorization itself leads to ingroup bias. This hypothesis has been borne
out in subsequent research. The separation of subjects into groups, without
any institutionalization of competition, has repeatedly been shown to cause
intergroup bias. Indeed, regardless of whether categorization is based upon
flimsy criteria such as preference between two abstract painters,8 ° or on
purely random selection, 8' systematic intergroup bias occurs. Competition
76. See SHERIF, supra note 75.
77. Id. at 96-115.
78. Id. at 151-90.
79. Id. at 95.
80. See Allen & Wilder, supra note 75, at 971; Billig & Tajfel, Social Categorization and Similarity in
Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 27 (1973); Brewer & Silver, Ingroup Bias As a Function of
Task Characteristics, 8 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 393 (1978).
81. See Billig & Tajfel, supra note 80, at 27 (found that discrimination occurred both when
subjects were told they were grouped according to preferences for painters and when informed the
groupings were random; discrimination was somewhat greater when the subjects were alleged to
share the same preferences, id. at 42-43); see also Kahn & Ryen, supra note 75, at 39, 42.
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between the groups accentuates the intergroup discrimination that is
generated by simple classification along benign criteria. That is, competition
appears to clarify the distinctiveness of one's membership in a group so that
ingroup bias is more pronounced, but competition is not a necessary
condition for bias to appear.8 2 Clarification of group differences can also
occur by emphasis on other factors, such as perception of cultural similarity
among ingroup members and dissimilarity to outgroup members, 83 ongoing
familiarity with ingroup members and unfamiliarity with outgroup
members, 84 or the belief that differences exist in goals, values, or attitudes
between ingroup and outgroup members. 85
A particularly distressing aspect of intergroup behavior is the direction of
the bias. Tajfel's studies8 6 presented subjects with the task of distributing
monetary rewards and penalties among members of an ingroup and members
of an outgroup. The choices available to the subjects were structured to
enable the experimenters to determine whether subjects sought to (1)
maximize the reward to ingroup members, (2) maximize the joint reward for
both groups, or (3) to maximize the difference in the amount received by
ingroup members and outgroup members. Tajfel's findings are startling: in
confirming strong ingroup bias where categorization was based upon a very
flimsy criterion, the subjects showed a strong preference for maximizing the
difference between their own group and the other group, even though that
strategy caused them to foresake a profit-maximizing option for their
ingroup.8 7
The suboptimal payoff found by Tajfel has been confirmed in other
studies.88 This discrimination strategy is caused by a desire to preserve own-
group/other-group distinctiveness.89 Even random classifications establish a
82. See Brewer, supra note 74, at 311-15.
83. The significance of the relevant studies is that the attraction of ingroup members becomes
stronger with familiarity, not that the outgroup members become less attractive on an absolute scale.
The relative effect, however, is that the discrimination between ingroup and outgroup members
becomes more pronounced. See Anderson, Combined Effect of Interpersonal Attraction and Goal-Path
Clarity on the Cohesivenes of Task Oriented Groups, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 68 (1975); Dion,
Cohesiveness as a Determinant of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 163
(1973); Wilson, Chun & Kayatani, Projections, Attraction, and Strategy Choices in Intergroup Competition, 2 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 432 (1965).
84. See, e.g., Worchel, Andreoli & Folger, supra note 75.
85. See, e.g., Allen & Wilder, supra note 75; Billig & Tajfel, supra note 80; Brewer & Silver, supra
note 80. See generally Byrne, Bond & Diamond, Responses to Political Candidates as a Function of Attitude
Similarity-Dissimilarity, 22 HUM. REL. 251 (1969) (predicting voting by attitude similarity).
86. See Billig & Tajfel, supra note 80; Tajfel & Billig, supra note 75; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy &
Flament, Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 149 (1971);
Vaughan, Tajfel & Williams, Bias in Reward Allocation in an Intergroup and an Interpersonal Context, 44
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY Q 37 (1981).
87. The classic article making this finding remains Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination,
Scl. AM., Nov. 1970, at 96, 101-02. See also authorities cited supra note 86.
88. See Allen & Wilder, supra note 75, at 975; Brewer & Silver, supra note 80; Turner, Social
Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup Behaviour, 5 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 5, 315-
16 (1975).
89. For an excellent description of the relationship between the drive for social identity and
intergroup discrimination, see Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-
Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCH. BULL. 307, 321-23 (1979); Turner, supra note 88, at 7-13.
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foundation for building a social identity within an ingroup, because
separation from others and consequent group membership are socially
significant to group members. The resulting ingroup bias is caused by a drive
for self-validation, and group categorization is an important vehicle toward
satisfying this social need.
As seen earlier, 90 individuals associate and maintain their membership in
groups that make a positive contribution toward their social identity, from
which they derive emotional or value significance. A further benefit derived
from membership in a group is its contribution to the members' sense of self-
worth. There is a tendency for all of us to define both ourselves and others in
terms of our respective locations within a system of social categories, such as a
social group. The exact importance one places upon membership in a group
is dependent both upon the differences perceived between one's ingroup and
referrent outgroups and upon the value placed on such differences.9'
Members of the ingroup derive positive support for their own self-concept
and self-esteem on the basis of favorable evaluations of their own familiar
ingroup compared with the unfamiliar outgroup that is seen as being different
and inferior.
Studies suggest that as the attractiveness of a group and its members
increases, and as the individual places greater and greater value on the
rewards derived by identification with the group or continuing membership in
the group, the degree of intergroup discrimination also increases. 92
Heightened intergroup discrimination is caused by the individual's need to
assure the primacy of his own social group and to recognize his status. The
stronger the attachment to the group's values, and the more important the
nonpecuniary benefits derived from membership, the stronger will be the
feeling that other groups are less worthy or desirable.
The relative strength of any ingroup bias is strongly related to two
factors: 93 the importance of the differences an individual perceives between
the groups and the familiarity of ingroup members with each other.
Familiarity appears to be a dominant consideration because it has been found
that the perceived differences increase and the value placed on the differences
90. See supra note 45.
91. See Tajfel, La Categorisation Sociale, in INTRODUCTION TO LA PSYCHOLOGIE SOCIALE 272, 292-96
(S. Moscovici ed. 1972). On the value associated with matters of difference, there is evidence
suggesting that bias occurs so long as there is a difference regardless of whether the difference is an
important or an unimportant trait. See Byrne & Nelson, The Effect of Topic Importance and Attitude
Similarity-Dissimilarity on Attraction in Multi-Stranger Design, 3 PSYCHONOMIC Sci. 449 (1965); Clore &
Baldridge, The Behavior of Item Weights in Attitude-Attraction Research, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 177 (1970), both studies concluding that intensity of one's attraction to those
expressing opinions similar to one's own may be uninfluenced by the importance of the topics being
discussed. Nevertheless, the greater the importance placed on the differing characteristic the greater
may be the degree of intergroup bias.
92. Allen & Wilder, supra note 75.
93. See Turner, Social Comparison, Similarity and Ingroup Favoritism, in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN
SOCIAL GROUPS 235, 250 (H. Tajfel ed. 1978) (factors are: importance of attribute to group,
identification with ingroup, and high comparability of outgroup to ingroup); Worchel, Andreoli &
Folger, supra note 75.
[Vol. 48: No. 3
Page 83: Summer 1985] CORPORATE COHESION
rises in proportion to greater familiarity among ingroup members and the
relative strangeness or unfamiliarity of the outgroup members. 94
2. The Corporate Context. In the context of the shareholder suit, several
forces are at work that cause the directors to identify themselves and the
defendants as a discrete group and the plaintiff as a disfavored outgroup.
Consequently, directors can reasonably be expected to exhibit intergroup
discrimination of the type described above. The directors called upon to
evaluate a derivative suit against their colleagues are not, and generally have
not been, isolated from the suit's defendants. As members of the board of
directors they continue to interact with the defendants, who usually remain
directors or officers of the corporation. Even members of a special litigation
committee who were appointed after the derivative suit was initiated are
legally bound under the organic requirements for committee membership to
serve as directors95 on the full board. The new special litigation committee
members and the defendant directors therefore serve as colleagues on the
same corporate board in addressing an array of nonderivative suit issues.
Consequently, the judges and those to be judged associate on a regular basis
in discharging their many tasks as corporate directors during the preliminary
derivative suit skirmishes. In doing so, they share a mutual duty to serve the
corporate interest, and they often adopt a common view of that corporate
interest.96  Analogous studies suggest that the effect of these shared
experiences is not only to bond the directors and the defendants together 97
94. Allen & Wilder, supra note 75, at 975, found that "[d]iscrimination (in the form of ingroup
favoritism and maximum difference favoring the ingroup) was accentuated in the ingroup conditions
having belief similarity and was attenuated in the ingroup conditions having dissimilar beliefs." If
the outgroup is perceived as having similar attitudes and beliefs as the ingroup, however, ingroup
favoritism still occurs. Id. The authors hypothesize that ingroup bias can better be overcome not by
stressing the similarity of ideas and beliefs of outgroup members, but by emphasizing the differences
that exist among the ingroup members. Id. at 976. Another process that can reduce ingroup bias is
separating the person from his ingroup so that the presence of his ingroup colleagues does not
reinforce the differences the subject sees between his group and the referent outgroup. Id.; see also
Brewer & Silver. supra note 80, at 399 (cooperative interdependence between groups reduced, but
did not eliminate, ingroup preference).
95. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 14 1(c) (1953);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (West 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L.Aw § 712(a) (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1983). Regarding board committees, see generally Aurell, The Corporate Executive Committee: .4
Dilemma for the Nonmember Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1965) (regarding liability of nonmember
for act of committee); McMullen, Committees of the Board of Directors, 29 Bus. LAw. 755 (1974); Note,
Executive Committees-Creation, Procedures, and Authority, 1967 WASH. U. L. Q 42, 53-73 (regarding
permissible delegation by board).
96. See supra text accompanying note 35. In competitive situations, when there is identification
with the ingroup's common view or position, it is unusual to find that a representative of the ingroup
will be persuaded to reject that view and accept that of an outgroup. See Blake & Mouton, Loyalty of
Representatives to Ingroup Positions during Intergroup Competition, 24 SOCIOMETRY 177 (1961).
97. Further evidence in the decisions of special litigation committees is that committees have
proffered unequivocal recommendations to pursue suits against only those who were not the
committee members' colleagues, but were instead subordinate corporate officers and personnel. See
In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Chase Manhattan Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Higgerson, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1985, at 1, col. I (Index No. 17864/84, Oct. 11, 1984); Tharp, Bank of
America Files 2 Lawsuits, Fires 5 Workers, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 5, col. 1; Zonana, BankAmerica s
Seafirst to Pursue Claims Against Former Head and Auditing Firm, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1984, at 4, col. 2.
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but also to form a basis upon which the directors can be expected to give
greater weight to the defendant's values, attitudes, and perceptions than to
those of outgroup members like the plaintiff.9 8 Indeed, the greater the
interaction between the defendants and directors, in terms of frequency and
degree of task complexity, the stronger the favoritism the directors can be
expected to express toward the defendants. 99 While this favoritism does not
necessarily cause the outgroup member (the plaintiff) to be held at a lower
level of esteem, in an absolute sense, than when there was no interaction
between ingroup members, on a relative scale a greater regard results for
ingroup members than for outgroup members. 100
More is involved in the dynamics of intergroup discrimination in the
demand or special litigation committee context than the seemingly simple
categorization of the nondefendant directors as "directors," a category which
also includes the defendants. As seen earlier,' 0 ' individuals place great value
on their selection to and membership on a corporation's board: They are
attracted to their colleagues and value greatly the associations they reap from
the directorship. The relative attractiveness and rewards of board
membership to the nondefendant director are important considerations in the
director's ability to be an impartial arbitrator of a colleague's behavior.
A variety of psychological factors contributes to ingroup bias. Not only
does each of these biasing factors, such as continued association, competition
from without, complexity of shared tasks, and mutual attraction contribute its
individual influence to the overall strength of ingroup biasing, but when
several complementary psychological factors occur together within the same
person, they tend to exert extra psychological force by their coexistence. This
enhanced effect is commonly referred to as synergism or wholeness; it means
that the total influence of a coherent system of psychological factors is more
than the simple sum of its components. Rather, when several compatible
psychological factors come together as a whole system, they jointly enhance total
ingroup bias, so the effect is greater than we would expect on the basis of a
simple additive model alone. This synergetic whole system has been observed
frequently in the psychological literature. It is as if a coherent attitudinal
system takes on a life of its own, and the wholeness enhances the influence of
each individual factor. As a coherent, congruent system within the single
person, this synergism creates compelling psychological forces toward
ingroup biases within the board or the special litigation committee.
98. See supra text and authorities accompanying notes 83-88.
99. See Brockner & Swap, Effects of Repeated Exposure and Attitudinal Similarity on Self-Disclosure and
Interpersonal Attraction, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 531 (1975). The Brockner & Swap
study found increasingly positive ratings of ingroup members as a function of familiarity with group
members gained through their interaction over discrete time intervals, but did not measure the effect
of this increasing personal attraction or its potential discriminatory effect on outgroup members.
These findings are presented infra note 100.
100. See, e.g., Worchel, Andreoli & Folger, supra note 75, at 131 (finding that prior cooperative
personal relations produced strong positive bias in favor of ingroup members and strong negative
bias against outgroup members); cf. Tajfel & Billig, supra note 75.
101. See supra text at notes 52-58.
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3. Cultural Similarity. Of course, both the rewards of group membership
and the attractiveness of being in a group are accentuated by the degree of
cultural and intellectual similarity among the group's members. Authorities
agree that people prefer to associate with others of similar cultural
background.' 0 2 In fact, cultural, personal, ethnic, and even linguistic
similarities are factors that increase the members' mutual attraction for each
other.'0 3 The heightened mutual attraction among a group's members causes
each member to have a stronger drive toward ethnocentrism and intergroup
bias. 0 4 Correlatively, cultural dissimilarity of an outgroup exacerbates the
intergroup discrimination. The relationship among attraction, similarity, and
ingroup bias is an important one in the American boardroom.
Even though there is a perceived "greening" of today's boardroom in the
era of the independent director, the boards of American corporations
continue to be distinguished by their homogeneity.' 0 5 Moreover, there is a
102. This phenomenon is apparent in children and increases with the subject's age. See Vaughn,
Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior in Children in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS
339 (H. Tajfel ed. 1978); D. MILLER, CHILDREN AND RACE (1975); Tajfel, Nemeth,Jahoda, Campbell
& Johnson, The Development of Children's Preference for Their Own Country, 5 INT'L J. PSYCHOLOGY 245
(1970); Vaughan, Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior in Children, in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN
SOCIAL GROUPS 339, 339-60 (H. Tajfei ed. 1978).
103. See, e.g., Bourhis, Giles & Tajfel, Language as a Determinant of Welsh Identity, 3 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 447 (1973); Brock, Communicator Recipient Similarity and Decision Change, I J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 650 (1965); Izard, Personality Similarity, Postive Affect, and Interpersonal Attraction, 6J.
ABN. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 485 (1960); Tajfel, Sheikh & Gardner, Content of Stereotypes and the Inference of
Similarity Between Members of Stereotyped Groups, 22 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 191 (1964). Other factors also
have been identified which contribute to the strength of ingroup bias because they relate directly to
the attractiveness of the group and the rewards conferred by membership and by identification with
the group. One such factor is the success of the group, with greater ingroup bias being detected
when the group is successful than when it fails. See Kahn & Ryen, supra note 75, at 42-43.
104. A sound review of the leading works appears in Rosenblatt, Origins and Effects of Group
Ethnocentrism and Nationalism, 8 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 131 (1964). A particularly interesting case
study of discrimination based on cultural differences is presented in Branthwaite &Jones, Fairness and
Discrimination: English Versus Welsh, 5 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 323 (1975). See also Festinger, A Theory
of Social Comparison Processes, in SMALL GROUPS: STUDIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 146 (A. Hare, E.
Borgatta & R. Bales eds. rev. ed. 1965).
105. In the context of the derivative suit, homogeneity of the American boardroom is important
primarily because of the impact that cultural similarity has on director cohesion and ultimately
ingroup bias. In this respect, it is important to recognize three criteria of a cohesive social class:
(1) ingroup interaction to the exclusion of outgroup interactions; (2) common lifestyles different
from other groups; and (3) an awareness of the class as a separate entity. See R. BROWN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 114 (1965). Each of these characteristics has been amply documented in the
sociological studies of the boardroom. The most popular of these studies is G. DOMHOFF, WHO
RULES AMERICA? (1967). Domhoff concluded that the cohesion between members of the American
upper class is based on cultural similarity. See id. at 38-62; see also G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES
(1970). Others have also reported on the cultural similarities of the American boardroom. See
generally G. DOMHOFF, THE BOHEMIAN GROVE AND OTHER RETREATS: A STUDY OF RULING CLASS
COHESIVENESS (1974); T. DYE, WHO'S RUNNING AMERICA? (1976); F. HUNTER, Top LEADERSHIP,
U.S.A. (1959); L. KAVALER, THE PRIVATE WORLD OF HIGH SOCIETY (1960); Dye & Pickering,
Governmental and Corporate Elites: Convergence and Differentiations, 36J. POLITICS 900 (1974); Hacker, The
Elected and the Anointed: Two American Elites, 55 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 539 (1961); Miller, American
Historians and the Business Elite, 9J. ECON. HISTORY 184 (1949). Elitism is not uniform across industry
classifications, however, and even varies among distinct subclassifications within the same general
industry category. See Weston, Social Characteristics and Recruitment of American Mass Media Directors, 55
JOURNALISM Q. 62 (1978) (finding broadcast media more elite than corporate leaders generally or the
print media specifically). There are indications, however, that within emerging industrial categories,
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great cultural gulf between the directors and their "adversary" in the
derivative suit. 10 6
The most open boardroom similarities are that ninety-three percent of
directors are college educated, 0 7 white males. ' 08 With a median age of 54,109
they are predominantly Protestant and Republican."t 0 In one older study, an
amazing fifty-six percent of all directors were found to be graduates of only
fifteen elite colleges; by comparison, only fourteen percent of the surveyed
directors were graduates of the top ten state universities."'I
The income level' 12 of public directors assures a lifestyle and range of
vocational interests that comfortably align them with the lifestyle of their
colleagues. To be sure, not all directors frequent Rodeo Drive, but they
remain a long way from Pat Nixon's cloth coat and, more generally, the
middle class. In short, directors have the financial means to share similar
social interests.
Far more important than socioeconomic similarity in attracting group
members and in maintaining ingroup cohesion is the fact that over seventy-
five percent of corporate directors are themselves captains of industry or close
advisors to those who are.' 1 3 Their common vocational interest fosters a
natural camaraderie between the outside directors and managers. They
approach their task as directors with a deep personal understanding of, and
respect for, the burdens of management. One of the rewards, and indeed the
paramount one, sought by serving on another corporation's board is sharing
particularly those devoted to consumer services or high technology, the managerial ranks are more
heterogeneous. See The New Corporate Elite, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 1985, at 62.
106. That the prosecutors of the derivative suit will be perceived as different from the directors
and defendants is suggested by the cultural background of the plaintiffs attorney. It is the plaintiffs
attorney who is important in this comparison because the plaintiff has an inactive role in the
derivative suit. Studies have repeatedly shown that the representatives of noncorporate America,
and more particularly attorneys involved in contingency fee litigation such as the derivative suit, have
an ethnic and educational background quite different from that of the legal advisors and directors for
public corporations. SeeJ. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR (1982); Cappell & Halliday, Professional Projects of Elite Chicago Lawyers, 1950-1974, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 291 (1983).
107. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982). This statistic may not impress many
as significant until it is recognized that the directors would have completed college at at time when
less than five percent of the population was graduating from college. See Weston, supra note 105, at
66.
108. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 4 (1983).
109. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 7 (1982) (median age of industrial directors).
110. Whereas approximately 58% of the United States population is Protestant, 73% of the
directors of public corporations are Protestant; and 18% of the directors are Roman Catholic in a
nationwide population that is. 30% Catholic. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1980).
111. See Vance, Higher Education for the Executive Elite, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1966, at 2-22.
More recently, it was found that the most popular four colleges attended by corporate executives
serving on the boards of American corporations in 1900 remained the top four schools for the 1975
boards of directors. See Sturdivant & Adler, supra note 36, at 130-31.
112. One study has placed the average income of the outside directors at $279,100, with less
than 14% of all directors reporting income less than $100,000. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES,
DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982).
113. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 6 (1980); see alsoJ. BACON, supra note 56, at 29
(Tables 5 & 6)(1973); cf Sturdivant & Adler, supra note 36, at 127, 131 (reports that 74% of the 444
executives studied served on the board of another corporation).
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insights gained from service on the board as well as from members' personal
experiences.' 14 In this way, each director seeks to gain from the others: It
would be unnatural for the outside directors to be skeptical or suspicious of
their colleagues and fellow managers.
Finally, it deserves mention that a strong pattern has been repeatedly
observed in studies of the background of new replacements to vacancies on
boards created by a member's departure. Continuing directors replicate their
cultural backgrounds and social ties by selecting new members who are like
themselves.' ' 5 Their selections tend to be individuals with whom a sitting
director has shared experience, either in a business setting, community
activity, or social organization. In sum, the boards of today's public
corporation remain as they have been for years, a culturally cohesive group.
The movement toward board independence heralded by commentators, while
addressing concerns that the directors are frequently financially dependent
upon the corporation or its management, has not introduced cultural
pluralism to the American boardroom.
Our goal has been to describe the social and psychological processes
within the boardroom that generate systematic biases into the directors'
assessment of their colleague, with special attention to derivative suit
procedures. As seen above, ingroup bias is detected when groups are
separated according to even the most benign criteria.' 16 Moreover, the
direction of such bias is suboptimal; it follows a scheme that avoids maximum
enrichment of the ingroup. Instead, the bias favors greater intergroup
difference. The strength of intergroup bias is increased significantly by those
very factors that characterize service on a corporation's board, such as highly
valued personal nonpecuniary rewards derived from the director's selection
and service, continuing personal associations in undertaking and completing
corporate tasks, and common cultural characteristics that are markedly
different from those of the plaintiff or his representatives.
We are careful to observe that the studies examined do not conclude that
directors are biased or that their well-documented proclivity to shield
collegues from derivative suits is the product of such bias. Indeed, this
precise question remains unexplored in the social psychology literature. Also,
even given our description of the many biasing agents, these studies do not
tell us whether natural psychological bias is so strong that it cannot be
overcome by the advocacy of plaintiff's counsel or by the directors' knowledge
that their evaluations will be reviewed by a court. Minimally, however, these
factors strongly suggest there is bias in the boardroom favoring colleagues
and disfavoring the derivative suit plaintiff. Furthermore, the preceding
description offers no support for current assumptions that "outside" directors
114. See supra text accompanying note 56.
115. See Allen, supra note 37, at 607; Koenig, Gogel & Sonquist, supra note 37, at 178-79.
116. It is also distressing that the individual's tendency toward ingroup favoritism is stronger
when making a judgment regarding fellow members of the ingroup than when acting individually.
See Dustin & Davis, Evaluative Bias in Group and Individual Competition, 80 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 103
(1970).
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can be expected to act impartially, absent family or financial relationship with
the defendants or a direct involvement in the underlying transaction.
III
LEGAL NORMS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS
The threat that bias will corrupt the directors' judgment of their
colleague's behavior or the corporate interest served by a derivative suit's
continuance has been recognized frequently by the courts in recent years," t7
causing closer scrutiny for bias of the directors' recommendation.' 18 The
courts' descriptions of the causes of director bias, as well as those offered by
commentators," l9 fail to be as complete as the explanation offered in the
previous sections, causing both commentators and the courts to propound
inadequate procedures to counteract the effects of director bias. In this
section, we critique both the structural suggestions offered in the proposal to
the American Law Institute' 20 and the ad hoc approach of courts in
responding to potential of director bias.
A. Directors and the Dilemma
To the corporate lawyer, it is elementary knowledge that directors are
seldom exposed to liability for business misjudgments and that courts only
rarely, and with great reluctance, intrude into directors' business decisions.' 2'
This "hands-off" attitude has its foundation in the view that shareholders
have greater aversion to risk than do managers. 22 The manager's role
117. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 1984); Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d
779 (3d Cir. 1982); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544
F. Supp. 1275, 1283-85 nn.4, 6 & 9 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In an important decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court described the director's empathy for the defendants as a "there but for the grace of God go I"
attitude. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
118. See infra notes 168-91 and accompanying text.
119. See Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva
Zapata, 37 Bus. LAw. 27, 65-70 (1981); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); Dent, supra note 8;
Steinberg, Maldonado in Delaware: Special Litigation Committees-An Unsafe Haven, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 381,
385-87 (1982); Comment, A Procedural Treatment of Derivative Suit Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 885 (1981); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 600 (1980); Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: Restricting the Power of Special
Litigation Committees to Terminate Derivative Suits, 68 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (1982).
120. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 7.07-7.12 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE].
121. See generally Arsht, Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 130-33 (1979);
Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standards-Safe Harbor but Chartered Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAw. 947,
958 (1980); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors
and Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078, 1095-1101 (1968); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or
Unchartered Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw.
919, 930-40 (1980).
122. Consider that shareholders may diversify their investments and therefore reduce their risk,
while managers are expected to devote their full energies to a firm so that their futures are more
heavily dependent upon a single firm's fortunes. See Klein, The Modern Business Organization:
Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1559-60 (1982). Professor Klein sees the inability of
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includes risk seeking, mindful that the greater returns lie with opportunities
having the greater risk. The linkage between risk and return offers the most
compelling justification for judicial deference to managerial decisions. 23 It is
argued that an overly intrusive judicial approach would discourage legitimate
and necessary entrepreneurial risk taking. Judicial intrusion creates a fear
that decisions resulting in corporate losses will subject corporate managers to
liability. This fear is heightened by the volatility of the business environment
and the frequent need for corporate decisions to be made on the basis of
incomplete or imperfect information.124 Moreover, even though theoretically
the circumstances under which a decision is rendered should be considered in
judging whether the directors were negligent, the crispness with which a trier
of fact will understand those circumstances as they then existed, as contrasted
with how they are reconstructed with the benefit of hindsight, interjects a
pernicious dimension into any activism on the court's part. Further
supporting this deference to the directors' business judgments is the view that
directors are, at least in the normative view, selected because of their
experience in, knowledge of, or sensitivity to production, finance, or the
marketplace. These are not entry level qualifications to the judiciary.
The commercial considerations which justify the courts' overwhelming
deference to the directors' business decisions are not present, however, when
a special litigation committee urges dismissal or when the board of directors
rejects a demand for suit. In these situations, the courts need not be
chastened by a fear that their disturbance of the directors' recommendation to
dismiss the suit will either expose the directors to draconian liability or
involve the court in an unfamiliar inquiry. Following a court's rejection of the
directors' recommendation, the causal link between the directors' judgment
and harm resulting from their recommendation is broken, so that a court's
disagreement with a committee's recommendation does not carry the
corollary effect of holding those directors liable. And the decision whether to
continue a derivative suit is not, strictly speaking, one uniquely within the
directors' natural business aptitude and beyond the abilities of the court.
managers to diversify their risks as a reason why they prefer corporate structures which enable
managers to control the firm without holding a significant amount of the firm's stock. Id.; see also
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738, 775-76
(1978); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980). See generally
Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 388 (1977).
123. For an interesting exchange on the effect that liability for violations of the fiduciary's duty
of care will have on socially desirable entrepreneurial activity, see Scott, Corporation Law and the
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv.927 (1983); Cox, Compensation,
Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745, 758-63
(1984), and Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis,
52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 789 (1984).
124. Feinberg & Levenstein, How Do You Know When to Rely on Your Intuition, Wall St. J., June 21,
1982, at 16, col. 3. For a case in which directors were protected when called upon to make a decision
on incomplete information, see Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22-25, 187 A.2d 405, 409-10
(1962).
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The absence of commercial necessity for deference to the directors'
judgment, combined with psychological attachment among the directors,
makes a compelling case for heightened judicial scrutiny of the directors and
their recommendation concerning the continuation of a derivative suit.'
25
One far-reaching approach to solving the question of how best to provide this
scrutiny is the provocative one recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 126 in construing Section 36(b)' 2 7 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Section 36(b), added to the Act in 1970,128 imposes a
fiduciary duty upon investment advisors of registered investment companies
with respect to their management fees and provides that either the SEC or any
fund security holder may bring an action on behalf of the company.
The question in Fox was whether a shareholder bringing an action under
section 36(b) is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 first to make
a demand upon the board of directors. 129 While other courts had held that a
demand was required, they equivocated about whether the directors' rejection
of the demand barred the suit.' 30 The Supreme Court found in section
125. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983); Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV.
597, 630-31 (1982); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 119, at 280-83.
126. 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-35(b) (1982).
128. Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1428-
30.
129. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
130. See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 942 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S.
Ct. 989 (1984) (remand in light of Fox); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 120 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982). The uncertainty on this question was introduced by the Supreme
Court's dicta in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), which proferred a two-step test federal courts
must follow in evaluating a special litigation committee's recommendation to dismiss a cause of
action based on federal statute: First, the court must decide under applicable state law what the
effect, if any, a committee's recommendation has upon continuance of the derivative suit; and,
second, it must determine whether a dismissal would be inconsistent with the policy embodied in the
federal cause of action. Id. at 480. As an example of inconsistency between a committee's
recommendation and federal statute, the Court referenced section 36(b). Id. at 484. Pre-Burks cases,
however, found no inconsistency and required the plaintiff to comply with Rule 23.1. E.g.,
Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 79 F.R.D. 36, 44-46 (D. Mass), vacated on other grounds, 580
F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978); Boyco v. The Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The Weiss court believed that, because Congress required 40% of the investment company's
directors to be independent, Congress necessarily expected that this independent body would take
whatever steps were necessary to protect the fund from excessive management fees, including suing
to recapture such sums. See 692 F.2d at 942-43. This analysis gives too much weight to the voice of a
minority group of directors (even though a sizable minority) and insufficient weight to several
conflicting provisions contained in the 1970 Amendments. First, section 36(b) empowers suit only
by the SEC or a shareholder; the corporation is not expressly empowered to sue. This omission,
while perhaps to be filled by implication, nevertheless is consistent with the view expressed in Fox
that Congress intended to preclude substantive involvement by the directors. Daily Income Fund v.
Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984). Second, section 36(b)(2) implores the courts to give such weight as they
believe appropriate to board decisions that approve compensation. This provision appears to reject
Weiss's argument regarding the role of independent directors in support of the position taken in Fox.
Congress, in seeking to curb excessive management fees, enacted both a requirement for
independent directors and an express cause of action for excessive fees. It therefore appears
Congress must have envisioned that the independent directors would at times be ineffective, so that
some auxiliary means to protect the shareholders would be necessary. Both safeguards were
believed necessary. Third, section 36(b)(3) limits recovery to the excessive fees paid within one year
of when the action was instituted, so that requiring a demand could have the effect of precluding full
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36(b)'s legislative history that Congress intended to remove the directors'
input completely. The special studies prepared for the SEC and
congressional reports accompanying the 1970 amendments catalogued the
impotence of the mutual fund directors as well as of the courts in curbing the
size of management fees.131 Without equivocation, Congress blamed the
directors' impotence on the incestuous relationship between the investment
company and its advisor.' 32 The Court in Fox, reasoning that Congress could
not have intended to subject the private enforcement of the fiduciary standard
it imposed in 1970 to the structural biases captured in the enactment's
legislative history, concluded that the action authorized under section 36(b) is
not a derivative action so that Rule 23.1 is therefore inapplicable.1 33
The most dramatic aspect of Fox is not its rejection of the necessity of
making a demand but its conclusion that the suit under section 36(b) was not
a corporate cause of action. The holding substantially removes a court's
procedural flexibility to deal with the twin concerns of improvidently initiated
actions against corporate officials and abusive practices that arise in
connection with settlements and voluntary dismissals of derivative suits which
Rule 23.1's procedures were intended to address. These effects were
achieved by the Fox Court focusing exclusively upon the potential tyranny of
the board of directors in responding to a suit. In doing so, the Fox Court gave
insufficient attention to the potentially corrupting incentives that pervade
representative suit litigation such as the derivative suit. i34 The derivative suit
plaintiff is self-selecting; without appointment or election, he purports to
represent the corporation's interest.1 35 Rarely do derivative suit plaintiffs
recovery. See Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982), afd sub nom. Daily
Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984). Weiss's response to this consideration was an expressed
hope that demand be made and responded to expeditiously. 692 F.2d at 938.
131. See generally WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R.
REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GRoWTH, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337 (1966). This history is examined in Daily Income Fund v.
Fox, 464 U.S. at 536-41.
132. See Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. at 536 (investment company is typically created and
managed by preexisting external organization known as investment advisor).
133. Id. at 842.
134. See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5; Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 269; Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Note, Class Action Treatment of
Shareholders' Suits under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2063-67
(1983). For the view that courts may overcome the problems created by Daily Income by continuing to
consider a recommendation of a special litigation committee, see Smith, Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox-No Demand Requirement for Section 36(b) Advisory Suits Gives Rise to Potential Abuses, 12 SEC. REG. L.
REV. 299 (1985).
135. An earlier requirement that the plaintiff seek stockholder approval before he initiated the
suit, see, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881), is now regarded as inefficient and
inexpedient. See, e.g., Interstate Refineries, Inc. v. Barry, 7 F.2d 548, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1925); Bell v.
Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 282, 487 P.2d 545, 547-48 (1971); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 533,
536-37, 134 A.2d 565, 567 (1957); Tevis v. Hammersmith, 31 Ind. App. 281, 287-88, 66 N.E. 79, 81-
82, aft'd, 161 Ind. 74, 67 N.E. 672 (1903). But cf. S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 114, 93 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1950) (majority of independent
stockholders can ratify actions of directors); Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 73, 128 N.E.2d
429, 436 (1955).
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have a significant ownership interest in the corporation. The plaintiff,
therefore, is driven neither by a sense of fiduciary duty to his fellow
stockholders nor by the expectation that his shares will appreciate in value
because of the suit. Indeed, throughout the derivative suit the plaintiff has a
minimal role.1 36 Rather, the contingent fee payable to plaintiff's counsel,
which is not totally dependent upon the size (or even the existence) of the
recovery,' 3 7 has a pivotal role in assuring the frequency of derivative suit
litigation.' 38 This is not to suggest that plaintiffs counsel can be insensitive
to the strengths of the suit's allegations against the defendants. His
professional reputation and continued effectiveness are important, but not
completely adequate, safeguards against abusive practices by the plaintiffs'
bar. Nevertheless, it would be an overstatement to suggest that either the
plaintiffs or their attorneys are unwavering guardians of the corporate interest
in their evaluation of the suit's worth and impact.
An improvidently prosecuted derivative suit may harm the stockholders'
interest far more than it harms the defendants of that action. For example, in
the event of an unsuccessful derivative suit, all the defendants' litigation
expenses are borne by the corporation, as are all the indirect costs of the suit
such as injury to morale, loss of reputation, or deflection of employee time.
Even though insurance frequently mitigates the amount of these losses, the
concern nevertheless is that an unsuccessful, ill-advised derivative suit visits
costs upon the corporation's stockholders. Furthermore, unlike its relative
the class action, a derivative suit inextricably weds all the shareholders,
through their stock ownership, to the costs and benefits of the suit. Only
through divesting their shares may they avoid the adverse affects of a poorly
advised derivative suit, whereas in a class action class members may protect
136. The plaintiffs deficiencies, due to health, experience, or education, in understanding the
nuances of the litigation do not disqualify the derivative suit plaintiff so long as the court believes
that vigorous representation is provided by the suit's counsel. Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829
(N.D. Ohio 1983); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,052 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Fischer v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
However, this is not to reject the requirement of a plaintiff. Even when settlement has been
approved, the derivative suit must be dismissed if the derivative suit plaintiff is no longer living.
Paolozzi v. Barber, 260 A.2d 176, 179 (Del. Ch. 1969).
137. Utilization of the "lodestar figure" upon which a contingency bonus is calculated by the
court, by recognizing not only the entrepreneurial risks of the litigation but also the unusual talent
and challenges present in the suit, allows courts great flexibility in approving the award of fees. See
e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470-72 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-70 (3d Cir. 1973). It is the court's
inability to measure fully the suit's potential, however, which introduces the pernicious quality into
fee awards. With the recognition that suits can serve the corporate interest even though they do not
produce sizable monetary awards, see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395-97 (1970), it
is problematic whether any large award of counsel fees, from the corporation's fisc or from the
amount recovered in the settlement, was the product of a suit with merit or an extortionate
settlement. See generally Coffee, supra note 134; Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards,
90 YALE LJ. 473 (1981).
138. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor In Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REV.
658, 663 (1956), analogized to the law of salvage in admiralty cases in explaining the necessity for fee
awards in derivative suit litigation: "There must always be a flavor of generosity in the awards to
success in order that an appetite for effort may be stimulated." Id. (quoting from In re Osofsky, 50
F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931)).
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themselves from the detrimental effects of a misguided or wasteful
prosecution by opting out of the plaintiff class. 13 9 This distinction invites
greater receptiveness to a pretrial screening of the derivative suit's impact
than to prescreening the class action.
Thus, neither the derivative suit plaintiff nor his representative can always
be expected to protect the corporation from harmful effects of a suit.
Moreover, in comparing the plaintiffs and defendants, the plaintiffs have more
circumscribed access to the facts surrounding the suit's allegations and the
suit's impact upon the conduct of the corporation's business than do the
defendants. Concerns such as these have, for over a century, supported the
view that the corporation, through its board of directors, has a unique vantage
point from which to assess the suit's impact on the corporate interest. °4 0
By removing section 36(b) actions from Rule 23.1, the Supreme Court
reduced substantially the flexibility of lower courts to address these concerns.
Even though concern for abuse in settlements and dismissals may, as some
have suggested,1 4 ' be effectively dealt with by characterizing section 36(b)
actions as class actions bound by the requirements of Rule 23, this deals with
only one of the potential abuses which afflict representative suit litigation,
namely the plaintiff and his representative sacrificing the class's recovery for
their own personal gain.
There is an equal concern in representative litigation that the action is
baseless or otherwise is harmful to the corporate interest. Protection against
this harm requires pretrial screening of the suit's merits. Class action
procedures, however, foreclose such review. 142 Therefore, even if section
36(b) suits were subject to class action procedures, it would remain beyond
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)-(3).
140. This appears to be the principal argument of the Supreme Court cases establishing the
demand requirement in America. See United States Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.,
244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadmill Goldmining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903);
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 457 (1882).
141. See Note, supra note 134, at 2063-66.
142. In Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd and remanded for entry offacts
and conclusions of law, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), the court held there could be no certification of the
action as a class action, unless the plaintiff established at a pretrial hearing a "substantial probability"
of prevailing on the merits. Id. at 501-03. The court seemingly acted to avoid the possibility of
needless and baseless adverse publicity which would follow publication of notice to the class
members. Id. at 501. The court felt that if publication could occur without the plaintiff having to
establish the case's substance, the defendants would be under intense pressure to settle the dispute.
Id. at 501-03. The Supreme Court rejected the precertification hearing of the suit's merits in Eisen v.
Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). Moreover, there is no testing of the class action suit
through a motion for summary judgment prior to the suit certification and the giving of notice when
the action is, as most class actions are, maintained under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See Jiminezz v.
Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, there are distinct signs that courts
sometimes evaluate the suit's merits, albeit covertly, in their consideration whether to certify the class
action. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L. J. 1123, 1144 (1974).
Many of those seeking reform of Rule 23 have seen the need for prescreening the class action suit's
merits prior to the certification of the class. See e.g., Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The
Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 313-14, 334-39
(1980); Committee on Class Actions of the ABA Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law,
Recommendations Regarding Consumer Class Actions for Monetary Relief, 29 Bus. LAw 957, 965-67 (1974);
Kennedy, Federal Class Actions: A Need for Legislative Reform, 32 Sw. Lj. 1209, 1224-25 (1979).
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the court's power to scrutinize their impact on the corporation prior to trial
except through pretrial motions, which are inadequate. 143 Had the Supreme
Court in Fox adhered to the position counselled by Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion, 144 Rule 23.1's demand on directors requirement would
be inapplicable to section 36(b) actions, but its other requirements would
have remained in effect and regulatory flexibility to deal with each of these
concerns would have been preserved under Rule 23.1. Courts could have
adopted a procedure for pretrial screening of the derivative suit's merits,
which would have avoided director bias while protecting the corporate
interest.
Fox is by no means alone in propounding a novel or dramatic response to
the problem of collegial bias. It is distinguished by the cleanness with which it
excised structural bias from the proceeding. Other judicial approaches have
evolved to meet the problem of fraternal protection of an officer or director
from suit. As discussed in the next section, each approach that has been
propounded appears as misdirected and as poorly suited as that adopted in
Fox. Courts adopting these approaches err in believing that director bias can
be effectively unearthed through judicial review. In our opinion, these courts
have committed the twin errors of seriously overestimating their own prowess
and misconceiving the foundations of structural bias.
B. The Evolving Judicial Review Standards for Committee
Recommendations
The special litigation committee was created by a melding of the business
judgment rule, the demand requirement, and statutory authority for the
delegation of board powers. It was intended to provide an efficient means of
judging the corporate interest served by a derivative suit when the full board
is otherwise disabled by self-interest from gaining the court's attention. The
defendant board members' ability to handpick the members of the special
litigation committee and defendants' perfect record before these committees,
however, have provoked questions about both a committee's ability to render
an unbiased assessment of the suit's impact on the corporate interest and the
broader issue of whether directors, in any context, can be impartial when
judging their colleagues' actions. The standards for review of the special
litigation committee recommendations are evolving, and there continues to
143. The advent of the special litigation committee is explained by the relative inefficiencies and
ineffectiveness of other pretrial devices to deflect the unwanted derivative suit. See Cox, supra note 8,
at 964-72.
144. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 542-47 (1984). Justice Stevens reasons that
Rule 23.1 does not impose a demand requirement, but rather a pleading requirement. That is, Rule
23.1 requires an allegation whether a demand has been made and it is from other sources that the
court must discern whether the absence of a demand bars the suit. In Fox, the other source was
section 36(b). The plaintiff satisfied Justice Stevens's interpretation of Rule 23.1 because his
pleadings clearly described that no demand had been made and Justice Stevens concurred with the
majority that Congress did not intend to subject the section 36(b) suit to the directors' discretion.
464 U.S. at 542-47.
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be a good deal of uncertainty surrounding these standards in many leading
cases.
1. Presuming Impartiality. The most skeptical judicial response to the charge
that directors are afflicted by structural bias is Auerbach v. Bennett,145 which
holds that it is inappropriate for a court to evaluate a special litigation
committee's weighing of the legal, ethical, commercial, public relations, or
fiscal grounds that support its recommendation that a derivative suit be
dismissed. 146 In this way, Auerbach effectively confines judicial review to two
narrow areas that have traditionally been open to attack by the plaintiff under
the business judgment rule: the directors' independence and good faith. 147
These two areas permit plaintiff challenges to the adequacy and
appropriateness of the committee's procedures; the substantive bases for the
committee's recommendation, however, are shielded by the business
judgment rule and according to Auerbach are removed from judicial
scrutiny.' 48
Auerbach and its progeny are important, not only for the limitations which
they impose on judicial review of the committee's recommendation, but also
because they stand as unwavering testimonials to a wide application of the
business judgment rule and to the courts' belief that directors are devoted
primarily to the corporate interest. These opinions are characterized both by
insufficient attention to the commercial considerations which justify the
business judgment rule's application in general business transactions and by a
marked insensitivity to the threat of structural bias. Courts persuaded 149 by
Auerbach's articulation of the limited judicial review necessary in special
145. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1979).
146. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
147. Id. at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
148. See id. at 623, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
149. The popularity of Auerbach may be explained more by historical accident than by courts in
sister jurisdictions being persuaded by its logic. A striking statistic is that in the nearly two year-
period between Auerbach and the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), which offers an alternative to Auerbach, nearly all special litigation
committee cases outside New York were brought in the federal courts. See Gaines v. Haughton, 645
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.
1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980);
Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (C.D. Mich. 1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Federal courts, even for actions raising a federal
question, must first determine the appropriate review standard under applicable state law. Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979). When these federal courts were required to decide the level of
review appropriate for a special litigation committee's recommendation, there were only two other
state court decisions besides Auerbach that involved committee recommendations. In one, the
committee's recommendation was easily ignored because an egregious lack of independence on the
part of the committee members was clearly reflected in the record. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.
App. 77, 106-07, 250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (1978). In the only other committee-related decision, the
court delayed until a later hearing its consideration of the effect and standard of review appropriate
for a committee recommendation. Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Dorchester Enters., Inc., 593 S.W.2d 390
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Auerbach, therefore, was the only state court decision available on which
federal courts could rely in defining the deference, if any, to be extended to a committee's
recommendation. These post-Auerbach federal decis'ions contrast with the much closer review of
committee recommendations and more balanced approach toward functions of the business
judgment rule exhibited in pre-Auerbach cases. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec., 582 F.2d 259,
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litigation committee cases have in effect announced a substantial presumption
that the committee has acted properly, so that its recommendation can be
overturned only in extreme situations.' 50
2. Questioning the Appointive Process. In contrast to Auerbach, Miller v. Register
& Tribune Syndicate, Inc. 151 expressed the fear that even the most finely tuned
adversative inquiry could not clearly distinguish rationally drawn conclusions
from collegial bias. The issue in Miller was whether a committee whose
members were all nominated to the board after the derivative suit's
commencement could cause that suit's dismissal. The Iowa Supreme Court
held it could not.' 52 The Miller court's approach, while not so sweeping as
that of the Supreme Court in Fox, nevertheless singled out a specific situation
in which committee recommendations were disallowed:
We believe that the potential for structural bias on the part of a litigation committee
appointed by directors who are parties to derivative actions is sufficiently great and
sufficiently difficult of precise proof in an individual case to require the adoption of a
prophylactic rule. We conclude that we should prevent the potential for structural bias
in some cases by effectively limiting the powers of such directors in all cases. 1 5
3
Miller is a welcome break from decisions that have shown no sensitivity to
the potential inherent in the appointive process. It reflects not only a popular
concern that the defendants will "shop" for "right thinking" individuals to
serve as their jurors, but also addressses the more subtle bias, described
earlier,' 54 arising from the fact that appointment itself bestows a reward upon
the committee members who thereafter can be expected to conform their
beliefs to those understood to be acceptable to their appointers. Miller,
therefore, represents a needed refinement in current practices by defining
director independence in terms other than their involvement in the
underlying wrongdoing.
Miller nevertheless recognizes the legitimacy of the special litigation
committee as a pretrial procedure. The court was willing to use its equity
power to staff a committee free of the defendants' hand in the selection.' 55 Its
concern is therefore limited to the process of staffing the committee and did
not reach other sources of bias that are present even among committee
members selected by an outside party.
274-76 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979), and Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
150. In Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 548 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ohio 1982), the
court, as in Auerbach, required actual proof of director bias to establish the lack of the director's good
faith. The fact that the committee report was deficient, but not materially so, was thus not sufficient
to impeach the committee's impartiality. Id. at 1148-49. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the district court's presumption of the committee members' good faith without rejecting Auerbach's
position on court review of the substance of the committee's recommendation. Hasan v. CleveTrust
Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 1984).
151. 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983); see also Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878
(1985).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 718.
154. See supra text accompanying note 59.
155. Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718.
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If the directors in Miller had been appointed by a court, the Miller court
would have accepted the committee's recommendation. 156 Similarly, in Stein v.
Bailey, 157 the court reasoned that the independence of a committee containing
only a minority of the board is inherently suspect and therefore decided that a
court should require the committee to provide persuasive evidence of their
independence and disinterestedness. 58 Both Miller and Stein are consistent
with the view that director bias is subtle and must be handled prophylactically.
Miller selects the more drastic prophylaxis. In neither case, however, did the
court hold that inspection of the committee's report was to be the sole means
available for dealing with director bias. Their threshold concern for
independence focused exclusively upon the selection and composition of the
committee.
Courts adhering to Auerbach may also be concerned about director
independence, but they are hobbled in evaluating bias by their general
assumptions about director behavior. Thus the two lines of cases disagree not
only about what is the correct approach in dealing with questionable, but
undocumented, director bias, but also about what factors should stimulate the
court's concern. Because the question of director independence is distinct
from a more global inquiry about the directors' good faith, it can be resolved
by examining the relationships a director has with the defendants, the law
suit, and the corporation. We believe that this examination should follow the
lines of inquiry offered in the first section of this paper. For example, how are
the directors appointed? What are their contacts with the defendants, and
how similar are their overall backgrounds? These are broader concerns than
those suggested by Auerbach, implying that Auerbach's articulation of an
independence requirement is primarily an empty prayer. The approach in
Miller, although drastic, is consistent with the purpose to be served by a
threshold requirement of director independence.
Shifting the burden of proof about committee members' connections to
the suit or the defendants will, under appropriate standards of independence,
produce the same result as asking if they can render an independent opinion
worthy of the court's consideration. Thus, the distinction between Miller and
Stein reflects primarily differences over the sources of director independence.
The objective should be to determine not who has the burden of proving the
presence or absence of suspect relations, but what those suspect relationships
are and how to establish an independent special litigation committee.
156. Id.
157. Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (majority of the sitting directors were
independent but delegated to a committee the task of preparing the board's response to plaintiffs
demand).
158. In other cases where a corporation's response to a demand is proffered through a
committee, even though a majority of the board is not disqualified to respond to the demand, the
committee has not been required to establish its independence. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d
1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. 11. 1982). Some commentators
have argued that committee recommendations may' be ignored, regardless of when or how the
committee is elected, whenever a majority of the board of directors is not independent. Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 119, at 320-26.
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Nevertheless, independence is, under contemporary standards, only a
threshold consideration directed toward limiting the most blatant sources of
director bias. Further tests are needed to preclude subtle biases.
3. Dispatching Skepticism through Judicial Review. The possible sources of
director bias recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado159 were broader in scope than those expressed in Miller. The
Zapata court observed:
[N]otwithstanding our conviction that Delaware law entrusts the corporate power to a
properly authorized committee, we must be mindful that directors are passing
judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members.
The question naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God go I" empathy
may not play a role. And the further question arises whether inquiry as to
independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against
abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.16
0
Zapata, however, did not include Miller's sweeping solution. While
recognizing a serious threat of director bias, the Zapata court reasoned that
judicial review of a committee's recommendation should not eviscerate the
valuable role the directors' judgments of a suit's worth can play in derivative
suit litigation. The court charted what it believed to be a middle course
between allowing committee recommendations so much deference that the
derivative suit is mortally wounded, on the one hand, and being so skeptical
of the committee that the corporation is totally unable to rid itself of a
harmful suit, on the other. Into this breach, the Delaware Supreme Court
flung a two-step test.
Under Zapata's first step, the court evaluates the committee members'
independence, good faith, and bases for their recommendation.' 6' Zapata
reinforced these requirements by demanding a detailed report of the
committee's investigation procedures and findings, by placing the burden of
establishing these factors on the committee, and by subjecting the
committee's reasoning to close scrutiny. 162 This scrutiny represents the
court's most sweeping response to the threat of structural bias. In its second
step, Zapata invited the reviewing court to exercise its independent judgment
in determining whether the corporate interest is served by the derivative suit's
continuance. 163 This discretion is to be exercised only in limited instances,
however. 164
The criteria Zapata proposed unfortunately are quite vague, so that
achieving Zapata's objectives primarily depends on the reviewing court's
general concern for structural bias. Zapata offers no insight into the meaning
of any of the first-level standards. Potentially the standards of
159. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
160. Id. at 787.
161. Id. at 788-89.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 789.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
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"independence," "good faith," and "reasonable bases" could be interpreted
and applied to generate more penetrating inquiry into the committee's
actions than the inquiry likely to result using the standards of Auerbach. Such
application would be consistent with the approach used in Miller. Indeed,
Miller's'65 decision to ignore the recommendation of a committee whose
members were selected by the defendants after the suit was initiated is
essentially an application of a demanding independence standard. t 66
The good faith inquiry coupled with the requirement that the committee
must articulate in its report detailed bases for its recommendations has
proven to be the most significant aspect of Zapata. The importance of these
twin requirements is amply illustrated in Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 167 a case
technically not within Zapata's two-step approach because a demand was
required in Mills, whereas Zapata reserves its two different levels of analysis
for cases in which a demand on the board has appropriately been excused. 168
In Mills, the corporation's response to the demand came from a committee.
Because it was a demand-required case, there was reason to believe the
court's review would be similar to that in Auerbach, where the plaintiff had not
been permitted to challenge the committee's presumed good faith by
demonstrating dissonance between the committee's report and the actual
facts. 169 Nevertheless, in Mills the plaintiff was allowed to question the
committee's good faith by articulating specific areas where the committee's
treatment appeared inconsistent with facts uncovered by the plaintiff.170 The
Mills court concluded correctly that inquiry into the committee's treatment of
the facts and resolution of the suit's merits was a necessary means to
determine the committee's good faith.
Mills's more demanding consideration of good faith is in stark contrast to
Auerbach and reflects the court's greater sensitivity to structural bias as a
recognition of Zapata's elevation of this concern. Thus, the impact of the
165. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 151-55.
166. This was once the position of the proposals now under consideration by the American Law
Institute. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.03(e) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
167. 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
168. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). When a demand on the
board is not excused, the directors' recommendation is sustained, unless the plaintiff rebuts the
committee's presumed independence, good faith, and use of reasonable procedure. Abramowitz v.
Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir. 1982); accord Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
169. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984); Galef v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. 466 F.
Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see
Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
170. See Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1283-87 '(N.D. 11. 1982). While Mills
entertained inquiry into the committee's good faith through examination of facts raised by the
plaintiff, its disposition of the issues raised by the plaintiff leaves much to be desired. The court
refused to discredit the committee's presumed good faith in the face of important deficiencies in the
committee's deliberations concerning facts raised in the plaintiffs depositions of the committee
members. These deficiencies were presumed by the court to be not symptomatic of bias within the
committee when it formulated the report, but merely the result of a lack of detachment once the
conclusion was reached. Id. at 1284 n.8.
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Zapata standard is dependent not upon its articulation, but on the strength of
the reviewing court's sensitivity to bias.
The content and application of Zapata's second step, in which the court
can exercise its own independent judgment,' 7 ' are even more elusive than the
first-step analysis. Zapata envisions that in the second-step analysis a reviewing
court may reject the committee's finding that the corporation's interest is best
served by dismissal. Or, even if the court agrees that the corporate interests
are served by dismissal, other considerations of public policy may override
parochial corporate interests and justify continuance of the suit.' 72 The
reviewing court's exercise of this power was intended by Zapata to be
discretionary. That discretion, however, appears to have been somewhat
circumscribed by Zapata's own language. First, Zapata suggests that its second-
step analysis is intended to produce serious consideration of how compelling
is the corporate interest served by dismissal only when the suit is
nonfivolous. 173 The court also envisions that the second-step analysis will
balance the committee's articulation of the corporate interest served by
dismissal against the presence of a legitimate corporate claim. 174 Both
statements confine the court's application of its second-step independent
judgment to cases in which, after review of the committee's report under the
first step, the court is satisfied that there exists a prima facie cause of action
and that the corporate interest served by the suit is consistent with the costs
and benefits of continuing the suit.' 75
The syntax of Zapata's two-step analysis suggests that greater deference be
accorded a committee's recommendation in the first step than in the second
step. As seen above, the court's independent judgment, exercised at the
second step, is reserved for nonfrivolous cases. Frivolity no doubt is in the
eye of the beholder. To be sure, it is neither necessary nor appropriate under
Zapata for a court to exercise its own independent judgment in step two when




175. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982), describes another
instance in which a court may exercise its independent judgment to reject a committee's dismissal
recommendation, namely when the "plaintiffjust lacks the resources, determination, or information
necessary in order to prosecute a meritorious claim on behalf of the corporation." Id. at 802. Abella
itself, however, appears to be the victim of this kind of information imbalance. In Abella, the plaintiff
lacked such vigor, having conducted only one deposition in the entire suit, a deposition that was not
directed against the committee. Id. Absent an adversary hearing in which the coherence of a
committee's recommendation, facts, and findings could be tested by a plaintiff armed with
information garnered through discovery, there appears to be no reasonable way a court can render a
reliable determination that either Zapata's first or second level has been satisfied. Abella recognizes
this in its suggestion that the court may delay or ignore a committee's recommendation when the
plaintiff has been financially unable to launch a reasonable assault on the committee or underlying
facts. /d. But ihe instances when such a result would occur are difficult to imagine. The plaintiff's
poor resources or lack of zeal is too often consistent with the view that the suit lacks merit. The more
likely, result is that which occurred in Abella, in which the court accepts the committee's unchallenged
version of the facts. lFhe court's dismissal is more suitably catalogued as a dismissal for lack of
prosecution than as a ringing victory for the directors' ability to assess impartially the corporate
interest.
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it concurs in the committee's assessment that the suit lacks merit. Unanswered
in Zapata, however, is how deeply the court should probe the committee's
report at step one, in making its threshold determination of the suit's merits,
before it can advance to the second-step analysis. The Delaware Supreme
Court's concern that directors retain some power to deflect a wasteful
derivative action 176 suggests an approach in which deference is extended to
the committee's opinion on the merits, except when a prima facie case can be
established solely on the basis of the committee's report showing that the
committee's dismissal recommendation is grounded on weak considerations
such as the suit's incidental costs exceeding its benefits.' 7 Zapata may well
envision that the committee's view of the suit's merits should enjoy the same
level of deference courts extend to director judgments in other areas in which
directors are, under the reasonable basis criterion, free to select from among
several reasonably supported alternatives. 178
There is good reason to doubt that Zapata provides an adequate formula
for coping with structural bias in the boardroom. It invokes the traditional,
weak standards for measuring the directors' independence, and it assesses
their good faith in a proceeding constrained by the necessity that it be more
economical than a full scale trial. Moreover, Zapata's second step may serve
only to underscore the deference to be accorded the committee's report
under the first step. In this respect, it is interesting that among the cases
which have rejected committee dismissal recommendations no qualitative
difference appears whether Zapata is applied or not.' 79 In each instance, the
committee report is defective on its face because, for example, the report was
either inconsistent or incomplete in its findings or conclusions. What appears
evident from these cases is that the precise formulation of the review process
is not nearly as important as is the court's willingness to entertain an assault
176. 430 A.2d at 786-87.
177. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120, 123-24, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afd,
672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982), where the court recognized a probability of securing a favorable
judgment but recommended against the suit's continuance in recognition of the defendant's
extraordinary services to the corporation, significant remedial action, and concomitant publicity. See
also Lewis v. Anderson, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,455 (C.D. Cal.
1981).
178. For example, in Elfenbein v. American Fin. Corp., 487 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the
court held that the directors of a parent corporation had a reasonable basis for their exercise of
warrants in a subsidiary corporation because they relied on counsel's opinion that the exercise
presented no perils under the tax laws even though two other experts disagreed. The court in
Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908-09 (Del. Ch. 1973), held that the decision of an
acquiring corporation's directors that a merger's terms were fair was reasonably based on a
projection of the earnings of the companies as combined entities even though a projection of the
individual companies' earnings suggested that the terms were unfair. See also Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1180, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981) (directors armed with opinion of counsel that bidder for control posed serious
antitrust problems had reasonable basis for defensive maneuvers even though ample evidence
indicated that antitrust issues could be resolved); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 159, 221
A.2d 487, 492 (1966) (alternative financing plans all deemed reasonable; choice among plans was a
matter of director discretion). See generally Arsht, Business judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
93 (1979).
179. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984); Holmstrom v.
Coastal Indus., Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,486 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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on the committee's report, even if that challenge occurs solely through the
court's efforts.
4. "Valuing" the Suit. Significantly, post-Zapata decisions fail to recognize
the discretionary aspect of Zapata's second step. Courts purporting to follow
Zapata have instead interpreted Zapata to require their exercise of
independent business judgment in all cases.'8 0  The most insightful
application of this interpretation of Zapata was by the Second Circuit in Joy v.
North, 181 which offered the following description of the reviewing court's
function:
[T]he burden is on the moving party, as in motions for summary judgment generally,
to demonstrate that the action is more likely than not to be against the interests of the
corporation . . . . [T]he function of the court's review is to determine the balance of
probabilities as to likely future benefit to the corporation, not to render a decision on
the merits, fashion the appropriate legal principles or resolve issues of credibility.
Where the legal rule is unclear and the likely evidence in conflict, the court need only
weigh the uncertainties, not resolve them. The court's function is thus not unlike a
lawyer's determining what a case is "worth" for purposes of settlement.
1 8 2
The approach advocated in joy is light years beyond the uncritical evaluation
embraced in Auerbach. Minimally, the Joy approach is a more fully textured
description of the review process initially proposed in Zapata. Moreover,Joy is
a rare instance in which a court has refused to follow a committee's
recommendation and dismiss a derivative action on the substance of the
committee's report. ' 83
180. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 732 (2d Cir. 1982); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,
546 F. Supp. 795, 801 (E.D. Va. 1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311,
1329 (S.D. Iowa 1981). In both Watts and Maldonado, the two earliest post-Zapata cases, the courts,
even though satisfied that the committees acted in good faith and were independent, did not grant
their recommendations that the suits be dismissed because each committee failed to offer an
adequate explanation of its reasoning. The result in each case, however, turned on unique
procedural configurations and not on the court's actual exercise of an independent business
judgment. The committee in Maldonado formulated its recommendation before Zapata was decided
and accordingly failed to offer more than the customary list of general grounds for dismissal without
factual support of its conclusions. In Watts, the plaintiff's power to challenge the committee's
recommendation had been curbed by the limited discovery permitted by the federal magistrate, so
that no action was taken in response to the committee's recommendation until the plaintiff was
permitted to discover the factors which influenced the committee's recommendation. 525 F. Supp. at
1329. The Waits court interpreted Zapata to extend to the derivative suit plaintiff greater discovery
powers than under the contrasting Auerbach standard. Id. The Watts court also was concerned that
the committee did not explain why.it deviated from its counsel's advice that the derivative suit be
continued for one of the counts alleged against the defendants. This inconsistency was singled out
by the district court for scrutiny at the hearing to occur after plaintiff's discovery against the
defendants. Id. Abella, as discussed supra note 184, can best be understood as the court's acceptance
of the committee's perspective on the dispute essentially because of the plaintiff's failure to
prosecute the case diligently. The court's examination of the facts, when it purported to exercise its
own independent judgment, is more consistent with the view that the court satisfied itself that there
was a reasonable basis for the committee's recommendation than it is with the overall persuasiveness
of the committee's recommendation. Delaware continues, however, to view the second-step analysis
as being a matter of discretion. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508-09 (Del. Ch. 1984).
181. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
182. Id. at 892.
183. One other case has rejected the committee's recommendation because of substantive
considerations in the committee's report. See Holmstrom v. Coastal Indus., [1984 Transfer Binder]
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The complaint in Joy arose from loans made by Citytrust Bankcorp, Inc. to
Katz, a developer in precarious financial condition. The loans ultimately
exceeded the maximum limit permitted by the National Bank Act' 84 to a
single borrower. Katz's default caused Citytrust to absorb a certain loss of
more than five million dollars.' 85 The special litigation committee was
established nearly two years after the derivative suit was commenced. The
committee, after nine months, recommended dismissal of the derivative suit
against the twenty-three "outside" defendants, concluding that there was "no
reasonable possibility" they would be held liable. 186 As for the remaining
seven "inside" defendants, who were senior officers of Citytrust and therefore
deeply involved in approving the Katz loans, the committee's
recommendation was equivocal. The committee reasoned that there was a
"possibility" the "inside" defendants had acted negligently and
recommended that settlement negotiations be undertaken with the "inside"
defendants. The committee nevertheless cautioned that its recommendation
that settlement negotiations were appropriate did not necessarily imply that
the committee believed continued litigation against the "inside" defendants
served the corporate interest. 87
TheJoy court's review of the committee's dismissal recommendation nicely
frames the dilemma that a special litigation committee poses to a court
responding to a recommendation that the derivative suit be dismissed. The
court was forced to choose between accepting a committee's evaluation of law
and facts, contaminated in some indeterminate amount by the directors' bias,
or pursuing a final resolution of the legal and factual uncertainties through
costly litigation of the claim. The special litigation committee's potential
contribution toward shortening the course of wasteful litigation lies in cases
such as Joy where the suit's outcome is problematic at the pretrial stage. This
situation arises when, on the one hand, the conclusions to be drawn from the
facts-such as the defendants' involvement in the alleged wrongdoing or the
existence of a business purpose which would exonerate them-remain
uncertain even after pretrial investigation or, on the other hand, when the
applicable legal duties and defenses are evolving and therefore indefinite.' 88
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,486 (N.D. Ohio 1984). Another case delayed any action in response to
a committee's report until the committee further developed its reasons for recommending dismissal.
Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1327-29 (S.D. Iowa 1981). And three
other cases have rejected the committee's recommendation because its independence and good faith
were doubted. Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 1984); Miller v.
Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App.
77, 107, 250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (1978); see also recommendations of suit against noncolleagues
catalogued supra note 97.
184. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982).
185. 692 F.2d at 895.
186. Id. at 884.
187. Id.
188. This is an insight overlooked recently by the Delaware Chancery Court. Chancellor Brown
in Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), observed that special litigation committees are
wasteful because they contribute toward "litigation within litigation." Id. at 511. Chancellor Brown
is also of the belief, however, that a committee's dismissal recommendation must be rejected if
material facts are in dispute. Id. at 508. If this observation were correct, his disdain for the
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When neither the facts nor the law are disputed, however, the special
litigation committee adds little to the defendants' arsenal for ridding
themselves of a wasteful derivative suit during the pretrial stage. The more
conventional pretrial motion for summary judgment (aided by
uncontroverted affidavits) or motion to dismiss are available to dispose of the
suit. 189
Therefore, if the special litigation committee is to foreshorten wasteful
derivative suit litigation, uncertainty about legal doctrines and factual
evidence should not disqualify a committee's recommendation.Joy raised both
of these concerns, relying upon each source of uncertainty to reject the
committee's recommendation. The defendants' involvement with the Katz
loan and the degree of nonvigilance by each of the outside defendants were
necessarily issues requiring factual inquiry. The conclusion about each
defendant would depend upon witness credibility, inferences drawn from the
facts, and the effectiveness of counsel. Moreover, the applicable legal
principles were not free of doubt in Joy. The outside directors' duty to
monitor the loan officers' performance and to respond to events threatening
the corporate interest are today perceived to demand of outside directors a
higher standard of behavior than was required of outside directors in earlier
years. 190 These uncertainties were emphasized in Joy's rejection of the
committee as a prescreening device is justified. On the other hand, if his concept of material facts
being in dispute is that the committee report is either inconsistent, incomplete, or unpersuasive, then
these are proper bases to reject the committee's recommendations quite apart from the case in which
the plaintiff and committee have different understandings of the facts or law. In the latter situation,
the committee should not be viewed as a dysfunctional prescreening device.
189. This conclusion is illustrated by the result reached in many pre-Auerbach decisions in which
liability was under the federal securities laws against directors and officers for questionable
payments. Federally-based claims were as easily disposed of when the defendants themselves sought
dismissal on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment as when dismissal was sought by a special
litigation committee. When suit was based on a violation of the periodic reporting requirements
mandated by section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982), courts
concluded there was no private right of action under the provision. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec.
Litig., 494 F.2d 528, 540-41 (3d Cir. 1974); McLaughlin v. Campbell, 410 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.
Mass. 1976); duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 628 (D. Del. 1973). Under proxy solicitation rules of
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), there is an implied private
right of action. The courts have upheld dismissals for failure to disclose bribery practices, however,
because of a want of causation between the alleged nondisclosure and the injury sought to be
redressed (recoupment of monies or ordering a new election). See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d
761, 776 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982); Herman v. Beretta, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec., [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The pattern of analysis is
no different where a committee has considered the problem of questionable payments and
recommended dismissal. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 828-
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
190. While the obligation of directors to inform themselves generally of the corporation's affairs
and financial position is well established, see Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), their
duty to establish systems to detect illegal or improper conduct by officers or employees is confused
by the restrictive view of the question taken by the leading case, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d. 125 (1963). Because of the passage of time since Graham was decided,
during which the political and social environment of business has undergone dramatic changes,
scholars differ regarding whether Graham would be decided differently today. Compare Veasey &
Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Unchartered Reef?.: An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care
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committee's recommendation. The court stressed that conflicting versions of
the facts might have to be resolved.' 9 ' Furthermore, the court indicated that
the guiding legal principles were quite general, so they could be interpreted
as reaching the defendant's conduct.' 92 Clearly these observations were
justified by the case's record; indeed, they were inherent in the nature of the
dispute. They should not, however, be independent bases to ignore a
committee's dismissal recommendation.
Joy's treatment of the committee's recommendation reminds us that
meaningful standards for judicial review of director recommendations have
yet to be developed. Joy's expression of these standards in terms of the
reviewing court's deciding a suit's "worth,"''93 while consistent with its view
that a court should exercise its own independent business judgment, is
nevertheless vague and, in fact, devoid of content. IndeedJoy's review is more
consistent with Zapata's admonition that the review procedure is analogous to
a court's response to a motion for summary judgment. 9 4 The Joy court's
rejection of the committee's recommendation was premised upon significant
differences between the committee's version of the facts and law of the
dispute and those which may possibly be established at trial. As reasoned
above, such a review standard adds little to existing pretrial procedures and
restricts the usefulness of the special litigation committee in protecting the
corporate interest by shortening wasteful litigation. At the same time, Joy's
recognition that the court should determine the suit's "worth" where
uncertainties abound appears to require upholding a committee
recommendation even when there are significant differences of fact and
law. 195 Nevertheless, Joy neither weighed the possible contrasting legal and
factual interpretations nor valued the suit's possible outcomes.' 9 6 For this
reason, Joy's review standards seem to be much more consistent with the
summary judgment approach referred to in Zapata than toJov's own "worth"
standard.19 7
Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919, 930 n.53 (1980), with Ward, Fiduciary Standards
Applicable to Officers and Directors and the BusinessJudgment Rule under Delaware Law, 3 DEL.J. CORP. L. 244
(1978). The proposals to the ALI envision that directors have an affirmative duty to be reasonablv
concerned with the existence and effectiveness of programs designed to oversee the corporation's
affairs. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4.01, at 44-48 (Tent. Draft. No. 3, 1984).
191. 692 F.2d at 894.
192. Id. at 896 ("Applying the standard of review set out above to the Committee
recommendation, we look first to potential liability generally without regard to which defendants are
responsible.").
193. Id. at 892. A potential problem with an approach in which the suit's mean expected return
is estimated by the weighted average of its possible outcomes (with the weight assigned each
outcome being its probable occurrence), and the decision to continue assessed in terms of whether
that mean expected return is greater than the suit's cost, is that where very' large damages accompany
an outcome with a low probability of occurrence the suit could be considered to have sufficient worth
to merit its continuance, even though it is a "long shot." See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
120, § 7.08(a)(3)(B).
194. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
195. But see Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), discussed supra note 188.
196. See 692 F.2d at 894-97.
197. See supra note 188.
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A court's response to the directors' rejection of a demand or a committee's
dismissal recommendation should be different from its evaluation of a
proposed settlement of a derivative suit.19 8 While the criteria used by courts
in considering whether to approve a settlement examine factors bearing on a
suit's "worth," the settlement paradigm is functionally distinct from the
court's review of the directors' rejection or recommendation. Settlements are
understood to involve compromises by each party.' 99 Weaknesses in the
plaintiff's case are expected to be traded for lower recovery, while weaknesses
in the defense's case are believed to increase the settlement. In this way, the
litigants' combined estimates of the suit's worth are incorporated into a single
settlement figure.200 When a demand is rejected by the directors, or dismissal
recommended by a committee, there are no trade-offs between the strengths
and weaknesses of each party's case. In that situation, it is inappropriate for a
court to inquire whether each side has made a suitable compromise or to
defer heavily to the parties' arms-length negotiations as assurance of overall
fairness. Only if the interests of directors or committee interests were adverse
to those of the defendants, an assumption not supported by the first section of
this article, could there be a sound basis for using the settlement review
paradigm. Furthermore, the record of directors and committees shows that
they look not toward compromise, but rather toward ridding the corporation
and the defendants of the derivative suit, regardless of its potential worth.
Despite its extensive description of how a court should evaluate a suit's
worth, Joy did not consider whether the suit's expected return exceeded its
probable costs in its rejection of the committee's recommendation. The court
was guided instead by weaknesses on the face of the committee's report in
which the committee's reasoning was both inconsistent and incomplete.
Because the report was flawed, it was unnecessary for the court to weigh the
suit's costs and benefits to determine whether continuance of the suit was in
the corporation's interest. In this way, Joy bears witness to the potential
strengths of Zapata's first step, particularly before a court genuinely
concerned with the risks of collegial bias, and not to the significance of
Zapata's second step.
Joy's treatment of the committee's report raises again a question whether
any meaningful difference exists in the nature and the purpose of Zapata's first
and second steps. Cases to date have yet to produce a result in which a court
has upheld the committee under Zapata's first step but rejected the
recommendation under its second step. Because the committee's bias is
examined at the first step by searching for dissonance among the facts,
198. For a review of settlement criteria, see, e.g., Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147-49 (3d
Cir. 1978); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Greenspun v. Bogan, 492
F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1974); see also Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders'Actions-Part II: The
Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 792-801 (1969).
199. Haudek, supra note 198, at 794-96. This approach is also counselled in designing a rational
litigation strategy. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 434-41 (2d ed. 1977); H. Ross,
SETFLED OUT OF COURT (1970).
200. See Ross, supra note 199; POSNER, supra note 199.
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findings, and conclusions contained in its report, it seems highly unlikely that
a court could uphold the committee's version of these matters and still reach a
different conclusion respecting the suit's worth. In this way, Zapata's andJoy's
exhortations for courts to exercise their own independent judgment of the
suit's worth seem to offer nothing more than an illusory step in the court's
review of the committee's recommendation. The false promise of Zapata's
second step is not troubling if it is assumed that each committee whose
judgment is deflected by structural bias will commit the unpardonable sin of
rendering a report defective on its face. The concern whether the directors'
bias will always give rise to a facially defective report arises because inherent
in any prescreening procedure is the need to limit the degree of discovery
against the committee as well as the range of matters inquired into at any
hearing convened to challenge the report.20' These procedural limitations
may well heighten the importance of the talents brought to bear in the
report's preparation. Hence, there may well lie within the Zapata-type review
a second type of bias: The well-recognized structural bias may be joined by a
bias inherent to the abbreviations that occur in the review process.
5. Coming Full Circle with the ALL. The proposals to the American Law
Institute in its ongoing corporate governance project are both visionary and
myopic, an affliction unsettling to those who look to the ALI for guidance.
The proposals are visionary in the unqualified choice made by the ALI to join
the ranks of commentators 20 2 (but not the courts 20 3 ) who have counselled that
the same review standards should apply to demand-required cases as are
applied to committee recommendations in demand-excused cases. The
proposals carry forward the demand-on-directors requirement 20 4 and confine
the bases for excusing these demands. 20 5 However, later provisions 20 6
trivialize the operational effects of making a demand. The purpose of demand
is no longer to provide the target toward which the defendant's colleagues
direct their shared beliefs that the suit is not in the corporation's best interest;
under the proposal, the response to the suit occurs through a
recommendation proffered independently of the demand. The
recommendation is made by a committee of directors chosen by the board 20 7
or, upon the corporation's request, by a committee of nondirectors chosen by
the court.208 The Reporters have thereby tailored the demand requirement's
effects so that the act of making a demand serves as a means for corrective
201. See Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1329 (S.D. Iowa 1981);
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 509-12 (Del. Ch. 1984).
202. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 8, at 1009-10; Dent, supra note 8, at 122-34; Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 119, at 331 n.358.
203. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1982); Mills v. Esmark,
Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10
(Del. 1981).
204. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.03(a).
205. Id. § 7.03(b).
206. Id. §§ 7.06-7.10.
207. Id. § 7.08.
208. Id. § 7.12.
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action or as a step toward the corporation's assuming control over the suit.20 9
On this point, the proposals appear infinitely sound. Certainly there is no
suggestion in the materials reviewed earlier that structural bias is less robust
when the so-called independent directors constitute a majority of the board
(so that under contemporary standards a demand is required and a lower level
of review occurs) than when only a minority of the board is considered
independent (so that demand is excused).
The centerpiece of the proposals to the ALI is the prescreening of suits
through the special litigation committee. 210 The current philosophy of the
proposals regarding the directors' capacity to be impartial in the prescreening
procedure is most apparent by reviewing the dramatic changes the proposals
have undergone during the project's brief history. The earliest proposals
contained demanding threshold independence requirements for committee
members. 21' In subsequent drafts, such a prophylaxis was sacrificed, and
protection from committee member bias was sought through allocating to the
committee the burden of establishing the propriety of its recommendation. 21 2
The most recent proposals to the ALI reflect no outward concern that
committees may act out of bias. 21 3 Instead, they incorporate only loose
independence requirements, 214 and the assignment of the burden of proof is
guided by inquiring who would have borne that burden of proof if a
committee had not stationed itself between the plaintiff and the defendant.2 15
209. Id. at 53-55.
210. Id. at 5-6.
211. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.03(e) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982), imposed significant
restrictions on the selection of committee members elected to the board after the suit was
commenced. See also supra, text accompanying note 166. However, that draft did not concern itself
with biasing through either the directors' association or cultural identity with the defendants.
212. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 7.07-7.12 (Council Draft No. 3, 1983). For criticisms of this draft, see Cox,
supra note 123, at 783-88.
213. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, at 103.
214. Committee members are to be both independent and capable of an objective judgment of
the suit. Id. § 7.10(a). Independence concerns only the director's familial or monetary relationship
to the suit or the defendants. AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1. 15 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). To date such relationships have
rarely been found as the basis for disregarding a committee's dismissal recommendation. For a
decision disregarding committee decision on such grounds, see Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984). The standard of whether directors can be expected to be
objective is a potentially open-ended one which could be most useful in unearthing committee bias.
On its potential scope, there is very little guidance from the case law and none from the proposal's
commentary. Two cases in point are Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709
(Iowa 1983), and Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978). Miller is not an ad
hominem judgment of the committee's impartiality, as envisioned by the proposals to the ALI,
however, but reflects the court's disapproval of the defendants' selection of their own committee.
Miller therefore is inconsistent with the current proposals to the ALI. Swenson is distinguishable from
Miller only by the fact that the committee members flaunted how superficial their independence was
by voting against the derivative suit before they assumed their positions on the committee. An
effective standard to unearth bias must surely be able to reach matters more subtle than those
illustrated in Swenson. With the proposal's thesis that directors are not assumed to be biased, it is
unlikely that the standard was intended to reach more subtle suggestions of bias.
215. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, at 100-02. The committee does have the burden
of proof both on the question of its members' being able to exercise impartial judgment and on the
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In general corporate parlance, the plaintiff has the burden of disproving the
committee's recommendation where the substantive allegation implicates a
fiduciary's duty of care; the committee shoulders that burden when the suit
alleges a duty of loyalty which has not been otherwise independently
authorized or ratified. The rationale for this treatment is simply that the
interjection of a committee into the litigation is not believed to be a legitimate
consideration for changing the substantive burdens of either the plaintiff or
the defendant from what they would have been if no committee
recommendation were before the court.2 16
The proposals, consistent with the quest for a prescreening device which
will shorten litigation, envision that courts will uphold committee dismissal
recommendations even when there are material differences in facts or law
between the plaintiff and the defendant. 21 7 For most cases, the focus of this
inquiry will be the suit's expected value,2 18 the remoteness of a judgment
adverse to the defendant, 2 19 or the presence of significant costs collateral to
the suit. 2 20 These are all factors which borrow heavily from Joy's "worth"
standard. UnlikeJoy, however, which considered only whether the suit's costs
exceeded its value, the proposals expand the committee's prerogatives by
authorizing dismissal of suits which have positive expected values but whose
probabilities of success are considered remote. 22'
The troubling aspect of the current proposals is not their treatment of who
has the burden of proof or the standards by which the court is to evaluate the
suit's worth. The proposals capture well the criteria against which a suit's
continuance should be judged, and earlier parts of this article have not raised
the allocation of the burden of proof as a reliable buffer to structural bias. 222
What is worrisome is the proposal's thesis that the potential for structural bias
adequacy of its investigation. Id. § 7.11 (b). These factors are not difficult to establish, however, and
the allocation of the burden is not an important consideration to either party. See Cox, supra note 8,
at 976-78.
216. The belief that the introduction of a special litigation committee should not change the
substantive strengths and weaknesses of the transaction underlying the conflict was originally put
forth in Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980), which reasoned that, because modern conflict of interest statutes
disable independent directors from retroactively approving self-dealing transactions, special
litigation committees may not insulate such a transaction from suit. Id. But see Cox, supra note 8, at
1003-05. Thus, the proposals to the ALI appear to have accepted Professor Buxbaum's reasoning
but not his prescription.
217. See generally CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, at 105-09.
218. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.08(c)(2).
219. Id. § 7 .08(c)(1).
220. Id. § 7 .08(c)(4). The proposals are more permissive in this regard than was the Second
Circuit inJoy, which would allow consideration of such indefinite considerations as reputational loss
and deflection of employee time only if the expected recovery was not substantially greater than the
suit's out-of-pocket costs. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983). Two other more specific considerations enter into the court's decision. Dismissal can occur
if, before the suit was initiated, the corporation had undertaken appropriate corrective or disciplinary
action. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.08(a)(3)(C). Dismissal is not appropriate under
any grounds, however, if it will enable the defendant to retain an improperly received benefit. Id.
§ 7.08(e).
221. Id. at 106-07.
222. See supra note 14.
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will not corrupt the committee. This assumption is expressed in the
commentary223 and underlies the proposal's conclusion that the burden of
proof for the basis of the committee's recommendation is guided by the
substantive character of the transaction challenged in the suit. We believe the
appeal of this position is solely that it assures purity between substantive and
procedural rules. It has little else to commend it to us. To argue that because
independent director approval of a self-dealing transaction places the burden
of proving waste on the plaintiff, and that, hence, an independent committee's
review of that same transaction should similarly place the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, operates on the false hope that the directors in each case are
impartial in their assessment of the transaction, their colleague, and the suit.
Earlier proposals followed the Zapata's approach of having sufficient distrust
in the director's impartiality so that the burden of establishing the bases for
their recommendation was placed upon the committee. We do not counsel a
return to the Zapata-like approach. A prescreening process should not be
premised on both distrust of committee members and the belief that judicial
review can deal effectively with structural bias.
In condemning both the current proposals to the ALI and the Zapata-like
approach, we suggest that the reviewing court's role is vastly different if it
follows Zapata and envisions that its mission is to unearth evidence or
suggestions of bias, from its role under the current proposals in which the
court evaluates the persuasiveness of the report free of an underlying concern
that its preparers are biased. For example, when the review is undertaken
with both a healthy awareness of and concern for the many biasing agents
which accompany the special litigation committee, incompleteness of the
committee's investigation or inconsistencies in its report are themselves bases
for disregarding the committee's dismissal recommendation. On the other
hand, it is expecting too much and is even inconsistent with the premise of
prescreening-that the proceeding be efficient-to demand that a
committee's factual or legal conclusions be free of doubt or, for that matter,
that its investigation be exhaustive. The proposals to the ALI reflect this view
in their recognition that committee recommendations should be accepted in
conflicts where facts or law are indeterminate and problematic. Under the
proposals to the ALI, however, deficiencies are accounted for in deciding
whether on balance the committee in a loyalty case sustained its burden of
proof or the plaintiff in a duty of care suit failed to overcome the presumption
of validity. Weaknesses in the current proposals are exacerbated by the
procedural economies dictated by any prescreening procedure intended to
foreshorten wasteful litigation. Even with the burden of proof, a committee in
sole possession of the facts and on the offensive against the derivative suit can
surely-especially with the, aid of skilled counsel-prepare a convincing
portrayal of the committee's perception of the suit which omits substantive
conflicts or otherwise inadequately treats important issues. 22 4 The plaintiff
223. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, at 103.
224. Cf id. at 73.
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operates at a strategic disadvantage because he is constrained in terms of
discovery and in the areas in which he may probe the committee's substantive
determinations at a hearing. In this respect, it is relevant that in a large
percentage of the post-Zapata cases, the plaintiff's attorney has not challenged
the substance of a committee's report, so that judicial review has occurred
without the plaintiff's input.22 5
Joy is distinguished as a rare case in which a court rejected a committee's
dismissal recommendation by disagreeing with the substance of the
committee's report. In Joy, however, the committee's report was rejected
because of both blatant deficiencies and important internal inconsistencies. 226
It remains to be seen whether, under the current proposals to the ALI, the
committee's view of the suit's worth would have been accepted. Under the
proposals, a court which has found a report deficient in some of its details, as
in Joy, may nevertheless conclude that the deficiencies do not erode the
overall force of the report. 227 The court could reach this conclusion because
the reviewing court's mission is not to unearth signs of structural bias, but to
consider the report's assessment of the suit's value, likelihood of success, or
presence of significant tangential costs. The overall effect, therefore, is that
even a committee report which is incomplete or inconsistent will still be seen
as the more complete and persuasive perception of the corporate interest
served by the suit's continuance than the plaintiff's more "slender" version of
the dispute. We believe the prescreening procedure currently before the ALI
will be effective only if significant changes occur in the composition and
selection of committee members.
IV
MOVING BEYOND INTERMEDIATE APPROACHES
Our criticisms of existing approaches to the directors' structural bias in
their assessment of a colleague's alleged wrongdoing cannot be solved
through narrow refinements in current derivative suit procedures. We reject
the basic premises underlying the current roles of directors and courts in
derivative suits.
225. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983)(plaintiff apparently allowed limited access to the committee's report yet presented no
countervailing information in appeal of the district court's dismissal of the derivative suit); Abella v.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 802 (E.D. Va. 1982); see aLso supra note 175.
226. 692 F.2d at 894-97.
227. In this regard, it is important that Joy was a suit involving the directors' alleged "care"
violation, for which the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the substantive inquiries of the
committee's performance under the proposals to the ALI;Joy, however, held that under Delaware law
this burden was on the committee. 692 F.2d at 892. For a case suggesting that in duty of care suits
before a court historically thought to be most solicitous of managers and directors, even the
unexpected may occur, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The fear that the more
sweeping investigation and findings of a committee may nevertheless overpower the more specific
exceptions taken by the plaintiff is found in Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1284-88 (N.D.
111. 1982), and Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 800-02 (E.D. Va. 1982).
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We believe that the foundations of director bias are much more robust
than those recognized by Miller,228 Stein, 229 and Zapata.230 We reasoned
earlier that Miller offers no explanation why a fellow CEO selected by the
court to judge the merits of a suit can be expected to be any more impartial
than one selected by the directors. 23' Stein's concern that a minority voice
may be chastened toward conformity by a larger group implicitly recognizes
the effect of a mutually attractive group, but the court's review of the
directors' independence followed traditional lines of inquiry by focusing on
their relation to the suit or the defendants, not their associations with the
group.2 32 Similarly, Zapata reflects a concern that directors may be biased
because of their own vulnerability to suit since their vocational positions are
similar to those of the defendants. Zapata's response to this concern in the
case of the special litigation committees was inadequate, 23 3 and it held that no
response whatever was needed in the case in which demand is not excused. 23 4
Zapata can be seen as recognizing the potential for bias, but seeing its effects
as more limited and of a lower impact than is suggested in the early section of
this article.
In sum, we believe that court decisions as well as the proposal to the ALI
have failed to reflect fully the psychological facts that colleagues are not
naturally impartial when evaluating each other at the demand of an outsider.
The ingroup bias among directors comes not solely because they have been
handpicked by the defendants, or because they represent a smaller number
than the defendants, or because they share similar positions. Rather, all of
these and many more factors taken together drive them to each other's side.
For these reasons, we conclude that the derivative suit should be reformed
so that the directors' recommendation regarding a suit's impact on the
interests of the corporation would be disallowed whenever the suit implicates
a colleague of the directors, be that colleague a fellow director, control
person, or a senior executive who associates on a regular basis with the
directors.
The removal of directors from their important and historic screening role
necessarily sacrifices their unique perspective on those matters implicated by
the suit that concern the conduct of the corporation's business, such as harm
to ongoing business relationships, injury to reputation, and deflection of
employee time. This sacrifice is not so great as it first would appear. First, the
impact of the suit on such commercial considerations is not endemic to the
derivative suit; they are present even in third party suits against corporate
personnel. It is merely that procedural practice in the past has not allowed
them to consider these factors in other types of litigation. This, while not a
228. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 159-78.
231. 336 N.W.2d at 718.
232. 531 F. Supp. at 693-95.
233. See Cox, supra note 8, at 974-94.
234. See 430 A.2d at 784.
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sufficient justification for ignoring them in derivative suit litigation, does
suggest that we may wish to consider whether these factors may be given
suitable attention in a proceeding that is tailored to invite inquiry into the
suit's costs and benefits and is not limited to the narrower issues of the suit's
legal merits, as are contemporary motions for dismissal and summary
judgment. More importantly, consideration of these costs is better viewed
tangentially to evaluation of the suit's merits, an inquiry not uniquely within
the directors' competence or sensitivity. That is, concerns for business
relationships, injury to reputation, and deflection of employee time are of
such an indefinite nature, in terms both of their magnitude and actual
existence, as to be highly untrustworthy as pivotal considerations in deciding
whether the derivative suit should go forward. These matters have greater
force when the suit's merits have been seriously questioned, because the
benefits of a potentially frivolous action are most attenuated, and matters of
morale and reputation are most implicated, when the corporation's personnel
are unjustifiably skewered in a derivative suit solely because of their corporate
positions. On the other hand, when the suit's merits appear to be strong,
these costs to the corporation achieve significance only when they are
proportionately large vis-a-vis the expected recovery. 2 35 Their consideration
at this point, however, should be subject to the same standard of proof and
persuasion as the challenges to the suit's merits.
In the context of screening derivative suits, the lawyer's analytical and
forensic talents are of greater import than the directors' education,
experience, and sensitivity; 2 36 the directors' unique contribution is made not
in the area of persuasion, but in the guidance they can give counsel in
identifying potentially sensitive areas implicated by the derivative suit.
Similarly, a broadly drafted pretrial screening procedure will permit the
directors to provide their own interpretation of a business transaction without
requiring that they serve on the committee empanelled to evaluate the
transaction that is the subject of the derivative suit's complaint. The medium
for this investigative inquiry, therefore, need not be through a committee of
the defendant's colleagues. The special litigation committee should continue
as the investigative vehicle to review the derivative suit complaint's allegations
both in terms of law and facts. But the committee's members should be
235. This approach was prescribed by Judge Winter in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 892 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). In duty of loyalty cases, the proposals to the ALI prevent the
corporation's litigation costs from causing the suit's dismissal, because the court may impose these
costs on the defendants who have breached their fiduciary obligations to the corporation.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.16(d) comment f, at 196.
236. All evidence suggests that the committee members' contribution both in terms of time and
substantive contribution pales in comparison to that of the committee's counsel. In a recent case, for
example, the members of the committee devoted all or a part of 35 days to examining the derivative
suit, whereas the committee's counsel logged 5000 hours in the case. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501,
511, 515 (Del. Ch. 1984). See also Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817,
824 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), and DeMott, Defending the Quiet Life: The Role of Special Counsel in Director
Terminations of Derivative Suits, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 850, 863-67 (1981).
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appointed by the court2 37 and should not include any of the defendants'
colleagues (past or prospective) or even those likely to share a cultural
identity with the defendants. Rather, the committee should consider, among
other things, the input of corporate personnel, including current board
members, on the likely commercial impact of the derivative suit.
We believe the court should continue to be the final voice on whether the
corporate interest is served by continuing the derivative suit. The court's
opinion, however, should be formed in light of a committee's investigation of
the complaint's allegations which allows modest input from the litigants.
With the committee comprised of members not likely to share a cultural
identity or associations with the defendants, the court would focus not on
signals of collegial bias, but on the soundness of the complaint's allegations in
light of the law and facts presented by the committee. Considerations of
efficiency require that the judicial proceeding be an abbreviated one, so that
some distrust will necessarily arise concerning whether the committee's
investigation considered all factual matters and whether the plaintiff was
permitted sufficient discovery to meet any negative aspects of the committee's
report. Because the committee will be cleanly sheared of collegial and
cultural identity with the defendants, however, there will be no cause to
believe that any such deficiencies will be systematically biased against the
plaintiff. Moreover, it would appear logical to place the burden of persuasion
on the committee to challenge the derivative suit complaint as failing to
establish a serious potential for serving the corporation's interest. This
burden appears reasonable because the focus of the hearing is on evaluating
the complaint, not on establishing the defendant's defense.
V
CONCLUSION
The approach we recommend responds to the need for a prescreening of
derivative suits to overcome the potentially corrupting incentives 238 that
pervade representative suit litigation as well as the harm that an ill-advised
suit can cause the corporation's stockholders. At the same time, it seeks to
deal with those social and psychological forces that have blinded directors in
their quest to serve the corporation's interests when rendering a
recommendation concerning a derivative suit. We have responded to these
concerns by removing the defendants from the appointive process, by seeking
237. The court has the power to appoint a committee, under the proposals to the ALI, only
when requested by the corporation; but that proposal contains none of the membership constraints
recommended above. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.12.
238. Professor Coffee reasons, in his article published in this issue, that the vitality of the
derivative suit is unaffected by the presence of the special litigation committee, because the threat
that device poses to the suit has merely the effect of reducing the suit's settlement value to an amount
below the cost of a special litigation committee investigation and report. Coffee, supra note 134, at
31-32. This reasoning overlooks both the fact that it is the corporation's money which funds the
committee's work and the fact that defendants can be expected to prefer absolution to settlement,
especially when the former carries no additional cost to themselves.
[Vol. 48: No. 3
Page 83: Summer 1985] CORPORATE COHESION 135
members who are not the defendants' colleagues, and by urging sensitivity to
the committee members' cultural background. Each of these are today
powerful forces which cause directors to edit the decision choice posed by the
derivative suit so as to give insufficient consideration, if any, to the derivative
suit's upside potential. Whatever the ultimate refinements in either the
demand requirement or special litigation committee, they must be sensitive to
these concerns and must, we believe, conform at least minimally to the review
procedures described above. Current procedures are gravely deficient in
addressing the malady of boardroom bias which if unremedied threatens the
continued vitality of the derivative suit.

